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Immigration Detention and Illusory
Alternatives to Habeas
Fatma Marouf*
The Supreme Court has never directly addressed whether, or under what circumstances,
a writ of habeas corpus may be used to challenge the conditions of detention, as opposed to the
fact or duration of detention. Consequently, a circuit split exists on habeas jurisdiction over
conditions claims. The COVID-19 pandemic brought this issue into the spotlight as detained
individuals fearing infection, serious illness, and death requested release through habeas
petitions around the country. One of the factors that courts considered in deciding whether to
exercise habeas jurisdiction was whether alternative remedies exist, through a civil rights or
tort-based action. This Article examines that question in depth, focusing specifically on the
availability of meaningful alternatives for detained noncitizens. The Article analyzes
challenges for noncitizens in bringing civil rights actions under Section 1983 or Bivens, tort
actions under the Federal Tort Claims Act and state tort laws, and actions for injunctive
relief directly under the Fifth Amendment and under the Administrative Procedure Act. By
demonstrating that meaningful alternatives to habeas are often illusory for detained
noncitizens, the Article argues that courts should err on the side of exercising habeas
jurisdiction instead of making cursory conclusions that alternative remedies can be pursued.

* Professor of Law, Texas A&M School of Law ( JD, MPH, Harvard; BA, Yale ).
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INTRODUCTION
Across the country, medically vulnerable immigrants have been challenging
their detention during the COVID-19 pandemic through habeas petitions
demanding release.1 For many, the door has been slammed shut with a finding that
the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over these habeas petitions.2 Without
direct guidance from the Supreme Court, circuit courts are split as to whether a
habeas petition may be used to challenge the conditions of detention, as opposed to
the fact or duration of detention.3 In Preiser, the Supreme Court indicated that a
habeas petition is the proper way to challenge the fact or duration of detention, but
1. See generally Jonathan L. Hafetz, Note, The Untold Story of Noncriminal Habeas Corpus and the 1996
Immigration Acts, 107 YALE L.J. 2509, 2524 (1998 ) ( examining the historical availability of habeas to
challenge noncriminal detention and explaining that “[ a ]liens in the United States have likewise been
able to challenge their confinement through habeas corpus since the nation’s founding” ).
2. See infra Part I.
3. See id.
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a civil rights action is the proper way to challenge the conditions of detention.4
However, the Court did not rule out the possibility of habeas also being used to
challenge detention conditions.5
The COVID-19 pandemic brought this jurisdictional question into the
spotlight. Some courts have exercised jurisdiction even in circuits that generally do
not recognize habeas as a vehicle to challenge detention conditions. These courts
have reasoned that the remedy requested is release, no conditions would be
constitutionally sufficient, or, in a small number of cases, that no alternative
remedies are available. Other courts, however, have rejected habeas jurisdiction,
contending that civil rights remedies or even tort remedies are available. Despite
extensive legal scholarship on the role of alternative remedies in examining Bivens
civil rights claims,6 no prior articles have explored the relevance of alternative
remedies in jurisdictional questions regarding habeas petitions related to detention
conditions.7 This Article examines that issue in the context of habeas petitions
brought by noncitizens, where alternative remedies are especially limited. This
Article argues that civil rights and tort remedies provide largely illusory alternatives
for most detained noncitizens and should not be viewed as substitutes for the writ
of habeas corpus.
Noncitizens can be detained for many reasons, even if they do not have a
criminal history.8 Some are subject to mandatory detention under the Immigration
and Nationality Act, including asylum seekers who present themselves at ports of
entry,9 while others are detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
as a matter of discretion.10 Although the average length of detention may be only a
4. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 ( 1973 ).
5. See id.
6. See, e.g., Alex Langsam, Note, Breaking Bivens?: Falsification Claims After Ziglar v. Abbasi and
Reframing the Modern Bivens Doctrine, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 1395, 1426–27 ( 2020 ) ( discussing how
courts are split on whether to focus on the formal existence of alternative remedies or the practical
existence and meaningfulness of the remedy in the Bivens context ); David C. Nutter, Note, Two
Approaches to Determine Whether an Implied Cause of Action Under the Constitution Is Necessary: The Changing
Scope of the Bivens Action, 19 GA. L. REV. 683, 705 ( 1985 ) ( discussing the Court’s move from an “Equally
Effective Approach” in Bivens cases to a “Damages or Nothing Approach” as one where the focus
shifted from “redressing constitutional wrongs” to separation of powers ).
7. Other articles addressing jurisdictional questions involving habeas petitions by noncitizens
have examined issues such as jurisdiction over noncitizens detained abroad and jurisdiction-stripping
statutes but not the issue of subject matter jurisdiction over conditions claims. See, e.g., Richard
H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, Substantive Rights, and the War on Terror,
120 HARV. L. REV. 2029, 2101–02 ( 2007 ); Gerald L. Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention, and the
Removal of Aliens, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 961, 980 n.105 (1998 ).
8. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225( b ) ( generally requiring detention of noncitizens arriving at a port of entry
who appear subject to removal, including asylum seekers ); 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1 ( generally authorizing
discretionary detention pending a decision of whether a noncitizen is to be removed ).
9. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225( b )( 1 )( B )( ii ) (stating that a noncitizen in expedited proceedings who
establishes a credible fear “shall be detained for further consideration of the application for asylum” ).
10. See 8 C.F.R. 1236.1; see also Alina Das, Immigration Detention: Information Gaps and Institutional
Barriers to Reform, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 137, 140–41 ( 2013 ) ( discussing the long history of discretionary
detention ); Alina Das, Unshackling Habeas Review: Chevron Deference and Statutory Interpretation in
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few months, there are hundreds of cases where detention lasts over a year.11 Like
other incarcerated populations, noncitizens in civil immigration detention have been
hit hard by COVID-19. As of February 22, 2021, ICE reported that 9,530 detained
immigrants have tested positive for COVID-19 out of 101,214 tested.12 This
positivity rate of 9.4% among detained immigrants is much higher than the rate of
5.9% for the United States as a whole.13 While the total number of immigration
detainees has dropped by two-thirds since the COVID-19 pandemic started and is
currently under 15,000,14 the average length of detention has almost doubled,
placing those who remain detained, especially those with medical vulnerabilities, at
heightened risk.15
Approximately seventy percent of detained noncitizens are currently in
privately operated detention facilities, and the rest are primarily in jails and prisons
operated by states or localities.16 Very few are in federally operated facilities.17 Some
Immigration Detention Cases, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 143, 205–06 (2015 ) ( discussing mandatory detention
under 8 U.S.C. § 1226( c ) ); Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
28–30 (1984 ) ( describing detention of noncitizens as “an awesome power in its own right” ); Denise
Gilman, Realizing Liberty: The Use of International Human Rights Law to Realign Immigration Detention in the
United States, 36 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 243, 267–79 (2013 ) ( arguing that a human rights framework calls
for limiting the use of detention ).
11. Mark Noferi, Cascading Constitutional Deprivation: The Right to Appointed Counsel for Mandatorily
Detained Immigrants Pending Removal Proceedings, 18 MICH. J. RACE & L. 63, 80–82 ( 2012 ) ( discussing
prolonged detention ).
12. See ICE Guidance on COVID-19, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, https://www.ice.gov/
coronavirus [ https://web.archive.org/web/20210222181131/https://www.ice.gov/coronavirus ]
( last visited Feb. 22, 2021 ).
13. See COVID Data Tracker Weekly Review: Stop Variants by Stopping the Spread, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/covid-data/
covidview/past-reports/02192021.html [ https://perma.cc/X7AA-WGFC ] ( Feb. 19, 2021 ).
14. U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF ’T, supra note 12.
15. See U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT
FISCAL YEAR 2020 ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL OPERATIONS REPORT 10, 11 fig.7 (2020 ).
16. See Detention by the Numbers, FREEDOM FOR IMMIGRANTS, https://www.freedomforimmigrants.org
/detention-statistics [https://web.archive.org/web/20210221044337/https://www.freedomfor
immigrants.org/detention-statistics ] ( last visited Feb. 22, 2021 ) ( reporting seventy percent based on
federal data ); Tara Tidwell Cullen, ICE Released Its Most Comprehensive Immigration Detention Data Yet. It’s
Alarming., NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUST. CTR. ( Mar. 13, 2018 ), https://immigrantjustice.org/staff/blog/
ice-released-its-most-comprehensive-immigration-detention-data-yet [ https://perma.cc/VKV9-D6R3 ]
( reporting that seventy-one percent of detained noncitizens were in privately operated detention centers
in November 2017 ); see also EMILY RYO & IAN PEACOCK, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, THE LANDSCAPE
OF IMMIGRATION DETENTION IN THE UNITED STATES 2 ( 2018 ) ( finding that sixty-seven percent
of detained noncitizens were “confined at least once” in a privately operated facility based on FY
2015 data ); Emily Ryo & Ian Peacock, A National Study of Immigration Detention in the United States, 92
S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 28 tbl.2 ( 2018 ) ( same ); HOMELAND SEC. ADVISORY COUNCIL, DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SEC., REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZED IMMIGRATION DETENTION
FACILITIES 6 tbl.1 ( 2016 ), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/DHS%20HSAC
%20PIDF%20Final%20Report.pdf [ https://perma.cc/QQ5P-4D6L] ( stating that sixty-five percent
of immigration detainees were in privately operated facilities ).
17. See U.S. IMMIGR . & CUSTOMS E NF ’ T , FY 2021 D ETENTION S TATISTICS ,
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention/FY21-detentionstats.xlsx [https://perma.cc/C87D-LAF2 ]
( Mar. 14, 2022 ) ( see tab for Facilities FY21 YTD showing that the Federal Bureau of Prisons operates
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detention facilities are owned by ICE and operated by private companies (Service
Processing Centers).18 Others are both owned and operated by private companies
that contract with ICE (Contract Detention Facilities).19 State and local jails
also hold immigration detainees, either with criminal detainees pursuant to an
Inter-governmental Service Agreement (IGSA) with ICE, or exclusively for ICE,
pursuant to a Dedicated Inter-Governmental Service Agreement.20 Either way, the
state or locality may subcontract operations to private companies.21 The three
“Family Residential Centers” that detain children with their parents are all privately
operated. Additionally, the U.S. Marshals Service contracts with both private
companies and local governments to operate detention facilities that are utilized by
ICE as a rider on the contract.22 Finally, the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP)
operates two facilities in Hawaii and Puerto Rico with a miniscule number of
noncitizens in ICE custody.23
This detention scheme, dominated by privately operated facilities, has a
significant impact on the feasibility of civil rights remedies, in part because claims
brought under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act require action under color of
state law, and a Bivens civil rights claim requires action under color of federal law. This
Article argues that courts should engage in an individualized analysis of whether
alternative remedies are actually available, taking into account the type of detention
facility, before reflexively denying habeas jurisdiction based on the notion that
detention conditions should be challenged through civil rights claims. Since the
founding of the United States, “the Great Writ was considered a primary
safeguard of individual liberty against a tyrannical Executive.”24 Before blocking
habeas as a remedy, courts should at least carefully evaluate whether a meaningful
alternative exists.
Part I discusses the Supreme Court jurisprudence on habeas petitions and
challenges to the conditions of confinement, explaining that the Court has left this
an open question for nearly half a century. Part I then examines the circuit split that
has resulted from the vacuum in guidance from the Supreme Court. Part I shows
that the distinction between a habeas petition challenging conditions and one
challenging the fact or duration of detention is not always clear, as the COVID-19
pandemic highlighted. By examining the reasoning of recent federal court decisions
in cases involving COVID-19-related habeas petitions, this Article identifies three
rationales that courts have utilized in construing a claim related to conditions as
only two facilities in Puerto Rico and Hawaii with an average daily detained population of only sixteen
noncitizens in ICE custody ).
18. Id. ( see tab for Footnotes explaining the different types of detention facilities ).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Paul Diller, Habeas and ( Non- )Delegation, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 585, 590 (2010 ).
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actually challenging the fact of detention. One rationale is that the remedy requested
is release. A second rationale is that no conditions of detention would be
constitutionally sufficient. A third rationale is that no alternative remedies are
available. However, many courts have also rejected habeas jurisdiction, reasoning
that alternative remedies are available. The availability of alternative remedies
therefore emerges as a critical issue in judicial decisions about habeas subject
matter jurisdiction.
Part II examines whether civil rights remedies, mentioned by the Supreme
Court in Preiser, are actually meaningful alternatives for detained noncitizens. Part
II argues that the state action requirement for Section 1983 claims creates a
structural barrier to relief for most detained noncitizens. The thirty percent of
immigration detainees in city and county jails have a better chance at showing state
action than the seventy percent in privately operated facilities, but given ICE’s heavy
involvement in supervising and monitoring, courts may well conclude that even
officials in city and county jails are operating under color of federal law, not state
law. For noncitizens in privately operated facilities, especially those that are
dedicated to ICE, it will be even harder to establish the state action requirement for
liability under Section 1983. Additionally, Part II argues that a Bivens remedy for a
constitutional violation under color of federal law is unlikely to be available to
detained noncitizens challenging detention conditions and policies after the
Supreme Court’s decisions in Abbasi and Hernandez, which sharply curtailed the
contexts for a Bivens action.
Part III turns to tort-based remedies, which some courts have mentioned as
alternatives to habeas petitions, examining claims under the Federal Tort Claims
Act (FTCA) as well as state tort laws. Part III argues that there is often no private
analogue in tort law to the actions taken by immigration officials, and multiple
exceptions to the limited waiver of sovereign immunity in the FTCA exist for
independent contractors, discretionary functions, and due care that may block a
claim brought by a detained noncitizen. State tort law also may not provide a
meaningful remedy because constitutional violations related to detention conditions
often do not correspond to any tort.
Finally, Part IV examines the possibility of injunctive relief as an alternative to
habeas, analyzing an implied cause of action directly under the Fifth Amendment
or a claim under the Administrative Procedure Act. Obstacles exist to both,
especially for noncitizens detained within the jurisdictions of the Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits, who comprise a majority of all detained noncitizens.
The Article concludes that the absence of meaningful alternative remedies for
many detained noncitizens weighs heavily in favor of exercising jurisdiction over
habeas petitions which request release based on the conditions of detention.
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I. HABEAS CORPUS AND CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT
In sixteenth-century England, the most important form of habeas corpus was
to “inquir[e] into illegal detention with a view to an order releasing the petitioner.”25
The Supreme Court has explained that, at an “absolute minimum,” the Suspension
Clause of the U.S. Constitution protects the writ of habeas corpus as it existed in
1798.26 But the federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, expanded the writ
of habeas corpus,27 which was never “a static, narrow, formalistic remedy.”28 While
the historical “core” of habeas corpus included challenges to the fact or duration of
confinement,29 a claim that falls outside that core may still be the proper subject of
statutory habeas.30 The plain language of statutory habeas extends to anyone who is
“in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States.”31 Whether this broad language encompasses claims challenging the
conditions of confinement, however, remains disputed.32
As explained below, half a century ago, the Supreme Court held that the writ
of habeas corpus encompassed conditions of confinement claims. But it later
backed off that position in a series of decisions stating that this is an open question.
Consequently, a circuit split has emerged regarding whether habeas can be used to
challenge the conditions of confinement.
A. The Circuit Split on Habeas Jurisdiction over Conditions Claims
In 1969, the Supreme Court allowed a federal prisoner to use the writ of
habeas corpus to challenge a prison regulation that prohibited giving legal assistance
to other prisoners.33 Two years later, the Court ruled that a petition by state
prisoners challenging “their living conditions and disciplinary measures” was
“cognizable in federal habeas corpus.”34
However, in 1973, the Court backed off that position in Preiser, where it
addressed the scope of relief state prisoners may seek under Section 1983 of the
Civil Rights Act. In Preiser, the Court explained that “when a state prisoner is
25. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 399 n.5 ( 1963 ), overruled in part by Wainwright v. Sykes, 433
U.S. 72 ( 1977 ).
26. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 ( 2001 ) (quoting Felker
v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664 (1996 ) ), superseded by statute, REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13,
119 Stat. 302, as recognized in Nasrallah v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1683 (2020 ).
27. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 474 (2004 ) ( quoting Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 380 n.13
( 1977 ) ).
28. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 ( 1963 ).
29. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484–87 ( 1973 ).
30. Kiyemba v. Obama, 561 F.3d 509, 513 (D.C. Cir. 2009 ).
31. 28 U.S.C. § 2241( c )( 3 ).
32. See infra Section I.A ( discussing the circuit split that has emerged ).
33. See generally Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 ( 1969 ).
34. Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 249, 251 (1971 ) ( per curium ), superseded by statute,
Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-71, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §
1997e, as recognized in Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (2006 ).
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challenging the very fact or duration of his confinement, and the relief he seeks is a
determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that
imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.”35 On the other
hand, “a [Section] 1983 action is a proper remedy for a state prisoner who is making
a constitutional challenge to the conditions of his prison life, but not to the fact or
length of his custody.”36 The Court noted, however, that “[w]hen a prisoner is put
under additional and unconstitutional restraints during his lawful custody, it is arguable that
habeas corpus will lie to remove the restraints making the custody illegal.”37 Thus, the
Court suggested that habeas may still be a viable way to challenge the conditions of
custody, but it declined to “explore the appropriate limits of habeas corpus as an
alternative remedy.”38
At least three times since Preiser, the Court has confirmed that this remains an
open question.39 In Bell, the Court decided to “leave to another day the question of
the propriety of using a writ of habeas corpus to obtain review of the conditions of
confinement.”40 In Boumediene, the Court declined to “discuss the reach of the writ
with respect to claims of unlawful conditions of treatment or confinement.”41 Most
recently, in Abbasi, the Court explicitly stated that it had “left open the question
whether [detainees] might be able to challenge their confinement conditions via a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.”42
Abbasi, like Preiser, suggests that, at least in some circumstances, habeas may
be used to challenge the conditions of detention. In refusing to extend a Bivens cause
of action to noncitizens who challenged the government’s detention policy after the
9/11 attacks, the Court in Abbasi noted that “the habeas remedy, if necessity
required its use, would have provided a faster and more direct route to relief than a
suit for money damages.”43 Given the absence of clear guidance from the Supreme
Court, lower courts have taken conflicting positions on this question.44

35. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 ( 1973 ) ( emphasis added ).
36. Id. at 499 ( emphasis added ).
37. Id. ( emphasis added ). But see Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 751 n.1 ( 2004 ) ( per
curiam ) ( observing that the Court has “never followed [ that] speculation in [ Preiser ]” ).
38. Preiser, 411 U.S. at 500.
39. See generally Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 526 n.6 ( 1979 ); Boumediene v. Bush, 553
U.S. 723, 792 ( 2008 ); Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1862–63 ( 2017 ).
40. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 526 n.6.
41. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 792.
42. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1862–63.
43. Id. at 1863. See generally Ojo v. United States, 364 F. Supp. 3d 163 ( E.D.N.Y. 2019 ).
44. See infra notes 45–58.
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The federal appellate courts are currently split on whether habeas may be used
to challenge the conditions of confinement.45 The D.C. Circuit,46 First Circuit,47
Second Circuit,48 and Third Circuit49 have allowed conditions claims to be brought
through habeas petitions. The Fifth Circuit,50 Sixth Circuit,51 Seventh Circuit,52
Eighth Circuit,53 and Tenth Circuit,54 on the other hand, generally do not allow
conditions of confinement claims to be brought through a habeas petition. The
Fourth Circuit55 and Eleventh Circuit56 have rejected the use of habeas to challenge
45. See Aamer v. Obama, 742 F.3d 1023, 1036–38 (D.C. Cir. 2014 ) ( explaining that the courts
of appeals are divided on whether habeas petitions are appropriate procedural vehicles to remedy
conditions-of-confinement claims ).
46. Id. at 1038 ( finding that a conditions claim related to being force-fed while attempting a
hunger strike was appropriate under a habeas petition ).
47. United States v. DeLeon, 444 F.3d 41, 59 (1st Cir. 2006 ) ( stating in dictum, “[ i ]f the
conditions of incarceration raise Eighth Amendment concerns, habeas corpus is available.” ).
48. Thompson v. Choinski, 525 F.3d 205, 209 ( 2d Cir. 2008 ) ( holding that a habeas petition
was appropriate in challenging denial of access to the law library, denial of kosher food, and contested
prison discipline ).
49. Hope v. Warden York Cnty. Prison, 972 F.3d 310, 317 ( 3d Cir. 2020 ) ( recognizing
jurisdiction over habeas petition brought by immigration detainees challenging conditions during
COVID-19 ); see also Ali v. Gibson, 572 F.2d 971, 975 n.8 ( 3d Cir. 1978 ) ( noting that a
conditions-of-confinement claim is cognizable in habeas “only in extreme cases” ), superseded by statute
in irrelevant part Revised Organic Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 98–454, 98 Stat. 1732, as recognized in Callwood
v. Enos, 230 F.3d 627, 633 ( 3d Cir. 2000 ).
50. Carson v. Johnson, 112 F.3d 818, 820–21 ( 5th Cir. 1997 ) (“If ‘a favorable determination . . .
would not automatically entitle [ the detainee ] to accelerated release,’ . . . the proper vehicle is a [ civil
rights ] suit.” (quoting Orellana v. Kyle, 65 F.3d 29, 31 ( 5th Cir. 1995 ) (per curiam ) ) ).
51. Luedtke v. Berkebile, 704 F.3d 465, 466 ( 6th Cir. 2013 ) ( habeas “is not the proper vehicle
for a prisoner to challenge conditions of confinement” ( citing Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 714
( 6th Cir. 2004 ) ) ); see also Velasco v. Lamanna, 16 F. App’x 311, 314 (6th Cir. 2001 ). But see Adams
v. Bradshaw, 644 F.3d 481, 482–83 ( 6th Cir. 2011 ) ( per curiam ) ( recognizing an exception where no
set of conditions would be sufficient to protect a petitioner’s constitutional rights by holding that an
Eighth Amendment challenge to lethal injection procedures was appropriate in the context of
a habeas petition ( citing Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 645 ( 2004 ) ) ).
52. Glaus v. Anderson, 408 F.3d 382, 386–88 ( 7th Cir. 2005 ) ( holding that habeas could be
used to challenge denial of proper medical treatment).
53. Kruger v. Erickson, 77 F.3d 1071, 1073 (8th Cir. 1996 ) ( per curiam ) ( “If the prisoner is
not challenging the validity of his conviction or the length of his detention, such as loss of good time,
then a writ of habeas corpus is not the proper remedy.” ). See generally Spencer v. Haynes, 774 F.3d 467
( 8th Cir. 2014 ).
54. Montez v. McKinna, 208 F.3d 862, 865 ( 10th Cir. 2000 ); Palma-Salazar v. Davis, 677
F.3d 1031, 1035 ( 10th Cir. 2012 ); Standifer v. Ledezma, 653 F.3d 1276, 1280 ( 10th Cir. 2011 ).
55. See Wilborn v. Mansukhani, 795 F. App’x 157, 163–64 (4th Cir. 2019 ) ( per curiam );
Rodriguez v. Ratledge, 715 F. App’x 261, 265–66 ( 4th Cir. 2017 ) ( per curiam ) ( noting that transfer
from one prison to another is not a cognizable habeas claim because it challenges the conditions of an
inmate’s confinement, not its fact or duration ). But cf. McNair v. McCune, 527 F.2d 874, 875 ( 4th Cir.
1975 ) ( per curiam ) ( allowing habeas for a challenge to segregated confinement, which could be
considered a conditions claim, although segregated confinement can also potentially affect the duration
of detention ). See generally Braddy v. Wilson, 580 F. App’x 172 ( 4th Cir. 2014 ) ( per curiam ).
56. Vaz v. Skinner, 634 F. App’x 778, 781 (11th Cir. 2015 ) ( per curiam ) ( finding a writ of
habeas corpus is “not the appropriate vehicle for . . . a claim challeng[ ing ] the conditions of
confinement” ); see also Archilla v. Witte, No. 4:20-cv-00596, 2020 WL 2513648, at *14 (N.D. Ala. May
15, 2020 ) ( collecting district court cases within the Eleventh Circuit holding that habeas may not be
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conditions in unpublished decisions but have not directly addressed the issue in a
precedential decision. The Ninth Circuit has also issued unpublished decisions
rejecting attempts by federal prisoners to assert conditions of confinement claims
via Section 2241.57 However, in an en banc decision in Nettles, where the Ninth
Circuit rejected a state prisoner’s attempt to raise a conditions of confinement claim
via 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the court found that it “need not address how the standard . . .
adopted here applies to relief sought by prisoners in federal custody,” leaving it an
open question.58
B. A Split Within the Split: Rationales for Exercising Jurisdiction
Within the circuits that have generally rejected the use of habeas to challenge
conditions of confinement, or that have not taken a clear position on this issue,
courts are divided on whether to exercise jurisdiction over habeas petitions
challenging detention conditions related to the COVID-19 pandemic. Many of the
decisions finding subject matter jurisdiction reason that the petition is actually
challenging the fact of detention, not the conditions of detention, either because the
remedy requested is release, or because no conditions would be constitutionally
sufficient, rendering release the only possible remedy. Additionally, some courts
have reasoned that no alternative remedies are available, while others have denied
jurisdiction based on cursory conclusions that alternative remedies are available.59
After examining these rationales, this Section contends that the availability of
alternative remedies is a critical issue that merits closer evaluation by federal courts
analyzing the jurisdictional question.
1. The Remedy Requested is Release
In exercising habeas jurisdiction over COVID-19-related claims, many courts
have focused on the fact that the remedy sought is immediate release. Numerous
district courts within the Ninth Circuit, for example, have found habeas jurisdiction

used to challenge the conditions of confinement ); Gomez v. United States, 899 F.2d 1124, 1126 ( 11th
Cir. 1990 ) ( “The appropriate Eleventh Circuit relief from prison conditions that violate the Eighth
Amendment during legal incarceration is to require the discontinuance of any improper practices, or to
require correction of any condition causing cruel and unusual punishment. . . . [ R ]elief of an Eighth
Amendment violation does not include release from confinement.” ( citing Cook v. Hanberry, 596
F.2d 658, 660 (5th Cir. 1979 ) ( per curiam ) ) ).
57. See Ibarra-Perez v. Howard, 468 F. Supp. 3d 1156, 1169–70 ( D. Ariz. 2020 )
( “Unfortunately, Ninth Circuit law does not resolve this question definitively. . . . And because the
door has been left ajar in this fashion, district courts within the Ninth Circuit have reached conflicting
decisions concerning whether a federal detainee may invoke COVID-19 . . . .” ).
58. Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 931 (9th Cir. 2016 ) ( en banc ) ( emphasis added ); see also
Zepeda Rivas v. Jennings, 465 F. Supp. 3d 1028, 1035–36 ( N.D. Cal. 2020 ) ( explaining that the Ninth
Circuit has not resolved the question of whether federal detainees can challenge the conditions of
detention through habeas petitions ), appeal filed, No. 20-16276 (9th Cir. 2020 ).
59. See infra notes 90–96 and accompanying text.
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proper based on this reasoning.60 A district court within the Eighth Circuit likewise
reasoned, “In such situations, where the relief requested is release, and the argument
is that confinement itself is unconstitutional, this Court agrees that it has the
authority to release individuals from custody through a Section 2241 petition.”61
Similarly, multiple district courts within the Fifth Circuit, including in Texas,
Louisiana, and Mississippi, have held that there is habeas jurisdiction because the
remedy requested is immediate release, which impacts the fact of detention.62 As
the Fifth Circuit has recognized, the line between conditions cases and those based
on the fact of detention is “a blurry one.”63 A judge in the Southern District of
Texas explained, “The mere fact that Plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge requires
discussion of conditions in immigration detention does not necessarily bar such a
challenge in a habeas petition.”64 At least two district courts in the Seventh Circuit
also applied this reasoning, finding that the petitioner’s claim “directly bears on not
just his conditions of confinement, but whether the fact of his confinement is
constitutional in light of the conditions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.”65
However, other district courts, including some within the Fifth Circuit and the
Eleventh Circuit, have rejected this argument, asserting that “tacking a traditional
habeas remedy on to a prototypical conditions-of-confinement claim does not
convert that classic civil rights claim into a habeas claim.”66 One court described the
60. See Calderon v. Barr, No. 2:20-cv-00891, 2020 WL 2394287, at *4 ( E.D. Cal. May 12, 2020 )
( stating that, despite decisions by many other district courts within the Ninth Circuit, the court was
“uneasy with habeas corpus as the vehicle to decide conditions of confinement issues” given Ninth
Circuit precedents, but finding “no need to make a final jurisdiction determination” because the court
recommended a stay of the case ).
61. Mohammed S. v. Tritten, No. 20-CV-783, 2020 WL 2750109, at *2 ( D. Minn. May 27,
2020 ); see also Toma v. Adducci, No. 20-11071, 2020 WL 2832255, at *2 ( E.D. Mich. May 31, 2020 )
( allowing the habeas action where the petitioner argued that release was the only remedy, and the
government did not contest jurisdiction ).
62. Espinoza v. Gillis, No. 5:20-cv-106, 2020 WL 2949779, at *2 ( S.D. Miss. June 3, 2020 );
Njuguna v. Staiger, No. 6:20-CV-00560, 2020 WL 3425289, at *5 ( W.D. La. June 3, 2020 ) ( “Because
Petitioner challenges the validity of his continued confinement and because he seeks immediate release
from confinement as the remedy, his claims were properly brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and the
Court has jurisdiction to rule on his petition for writ of habeas corpus.” ); Beswick v. Barr,
No. 5:20-cv-98, 2020 WL 3520312, at *2 ( S.D. Miss. June 29, 2020 ) ( finding habeas a proper
vehicle: “If the Court were to grant the Petitioner’s requested relief, it would result in his immediate
release. Therefore, the Petitioner has brought a habeas matter because the requested relief challenges
the fact or duration of confinement.” ); Vazquez Barrera v. Wolf, 455 F. Supp. 3d 330, 337 ( S.D. Tex. 2020 )
( “Because Plaintiffs are challenging the fact of their detention as unconstitutional and seek relief in the
form of immediate release, their claims fall squarely in the realm of habeas corpus.” ).
63. Poree v. Collins, 866 F.3d 235, 243 (5th Cir. 2017 ) ( quoting Cook v. Tex. Dep’t of
Crim. Just. Transitional Plan. Dep’t, 37 F.3d 166, 168 ( 5th Cir. 1994 ) ); see also Vazquez Barrera, 455
F. Supp. 3d at 336.
64. Vazquez Barrera, 455 F. Supp. 3d at 337 ( emphasis added ).
65. Ruderman v. Kolitwenzew, 459 F. Supp. 3d 1121, 1131–32 ( C.D. Ill. 2020 ); Favi
v. Kolitwenzew, No. 20-CV-2087, 2020 WL 2114566, at *7 ( C.D. Ill. May 4, 2020 ), appeal dismissed,
No. 20-2372, 2020 WL 8262041 (7th Cir. Oct. 5, 2020 ).
66. Archilla v. Witte, No. 4:20-CV-00596, 2020 WL 2513648, at *12 ( N.D. Ala. May 15, 2020 );
Umarbaev v. Moore, No. 3:20-CV-1279, 2020 WL 3051448, at *4 (N.D. Tex. June 6, 2020 ).
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petitioners’ exclusive request for release, rather than for improvement of conditions,
as a “self-imposed limitation” that “does not save their habeas petition.”67 Another
noted, “This argument proves too much. If petitioners were correct, then any time
a detainee requests immediate release—no matter the basis for that relief—the
appropriate vehicle would be [habeas].”68
Some courts have also simply rejected the notion that release from detention
is the only meaningful remedy.69 If a detention center were to adopt all of the
protective measures set forth by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC), these courts reason, then that would be an adequate remedy.70 As a district
court in Georgia explained:
Even if an exception to [the] rule exists where the unconstitutional
conditions cannot be remedied in some other way, the Court finds that,
based on the present record, release from confinement is not the only
way to remedy the alleged unconstitutional conditions of confinement
here. Petitioners essentially concede this fact by suggesting that if
Respondents followed the CDC Guidance, the risk of infection would be
substantially reduced.71
A district court in Texas also was not convinced that the “extraordinary
remedy” of release was warranted given the “protective measures and safety
protocols detailed” by the government.72 Similarly, a district court in New Mexico
was not persuaded by the petitioner’s request for release, finding that the petitioner
had “failed to show why another, lesser remedy, such as changing the conditions of
confinement [was] not available.”73 Merely requesting release therefore may not be
sufficient to convince a court that habeas is the proper vehicle.
2. No Set of Conditions Would Be Constitutionally Sufficient
A more persuasive argument for habeas jurisdiction is if the petition alleges
that “no set of conditions” exists that would be constitutionally sufficient, rendering
release the only possible remedy.74 This was the Sixth Circuit’s rationale in exercising
habeas jurisdiction in Wilson.75 Wilson involved a habeas petition brought by
medically vulnerable prisoners asserting deliberate indifference in violation of the
67. Toure v. Hott, 458 F. Supp. 3d 387, 399 ( E.D. Va. 2020 ).
68. Codner v. Choate, No. 20-cv-01050, 2020 WL 2769938, at *7 ( D. Colo. May 27, 2020 ).
69. Matos v. Lopez Vega, No. 20-CIV-60784, 2020 WL 2298775, at *5–6 ( S.D. Fla. May 6, 2020 ).
70. A.S.M. v. Warden, Stewart Cnty. Det. Ctr., 467 F. Supp. 3d 1341, 1349 ( M.D. Ga. 2020 ).
71. Id.
72. Cureno Hernandez v. Mora, 467 F. Supp. 3d 454, 462 ( N.D. Tex. 2020 ).
73. Rodas Godinez v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, No. 2:20-cv-466, 2020 WL 3402059, at
*3 ( D.N.M. June 19, 2020 ) ( citing Codner v. Choate, No. 20-cv-01050, 2020 WL 2769938, at *6
( D. Colo. May 27, 2020 ).
74. Malam v. Adducci, 452 F. Supp. 3d 643, 650 ( E.D. Mich. 2020 ) ( citing Nelson v. Campbell,
541 U.S. 637, 644−45 ( 2004 ) ).
75. Wilson v. Williams, 961 F.3d 829, 838 (6th Cir. 2020 ) (citing Adams v. Bradshaw, 644 F.3d
481, 483 ( 6th Cir. 2011 ) ( per curiam ) ).
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Eighth Amendment based on the failure to create safe conditions during the
pandemic.76 In concluding that habeas was the proper vehicle, the court stressed
that the petitioner had argued that “the constitutional violations occurring at [the
prison] as a result of the pandemic can be remedied only by release.”77 Relying on
Wilson, the Fifth and Tenth Circuits have also acknowledged, in unpublished
decisions, that habeas jurisdiction may exist if no set of conditions would be
constitutionally sufficient.78
Numerous district courts have similarly applied this rationale. For instance, a
district court in Louisiana opined that “[i]f no set of conditions is sufficient to
protect a detainee’s constitutional rights, his claim for relief is cognizable in
habeas.”79 Similarly, two district courts in Minnesota explained, “to the extent that
the conditions of confinement create a due process violation that cannot be
remedied and for which death is a probability, this Court finds that it has the subject
matter jurisdiction to entertain a habeas petition under Section 2241 for the release
of Petitioners.”80
In making this argument, petitioners have stressed that social distancing simply
is not possible in a detained setting. In Malam, for example, the petitioner alleged
that social distancing was impossible in the detention center and the government
conceded that fact.81 The petitioner argued that “no matter what steps were taken,
due to her underlying serious health conditions, there is no communal holding
facility where she could be incarcerated during the COVID-19 pandemic that would
be constitutional.”82 The court therefore considered her claim “a challenge to the
continued validity of confinement itself” and found it properly brought as a habeas
petition.83 Similarly, in Awshana, where the petitioners argued that “no custodial
condition will protect them from infection,” the court found habeas jurisdiction.84
But many courts remain unpersuaded that no conditions exist that can remedy
the situation. For example, a court in the Southern District of Georgia found that
the conditions alleged to contribute to the risk of COVID-19 “could be remedied
with internal facility changes, such as more vigilant screening measures, increased

76. Id.
77. Id. ( emphasis added ).
78. Medina v. Williams, 823 F. App’x 674, 676 ( 10th Cir. 2020 ); Cheek v. Warden of
Fed. Med. Ctr., 835 F. App’x 737, 739 ( 5th Cir. 2020 ) (per curiam ).
79. Njuguna v. Staiger, No. 6:20-CV-00560, 2020 WL 3425289, at *5 ( W.D. La. June 3, 2020 );
Malam, 452 F. Supp. 3d at 650.
80. Mohammed S. v. Tritten, No. 20-cv-793, 2020 WL 2750836, at *19 ( D. Minn. Apr. 28,
2020 ), report and recommendation adopted, No. 20-CV-783, 2020 WL 2750109 ( D. Minn. May 27, 2020 );
Angelica C. v. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, No. 20-cv-913, 2020 WL 3441461, at *11 (D. Minn. June 5,
2020 ), report and recommendation adopted, No. 20-CV-913, 2020 WL 3429945 (D. Minn. June 23, 2020 ).
81. Malam, 452 F. Supp. at 650–51.
82. Id. at 651.
83. Id.; see also Wilson v. Williams, 961 F.3d 829, 838 ( 6th Cir. 2020 ) (accepting habeas
jurisdiction where infections were rampant among inmates and staff and testing was limited ).
84. Awshana v. Adducci, 453 F. Supp. 3d 1045, 1047 ( E.D. Mich. 2020 ).
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availability of cleaning supplies, and greater efforts to create distance between
detainees.”85 A court in the District of New Mexico similarly held that the petitioner
had not shown why the court could not “order improvements to his conditions of
confinement, such as social distancing, mask use, disinfection, improved screening,
or testing.”86
Other courts have denied preliminary relief but explicitly left open the
possibility for habeas jurisdiction if conditions cannot be corrected.87 For example,
in Gayle, which involved noncitizens at three South Florida detention centers, the
court recognized that “[i]f no correction is feasible, then the remedy which the
Eleventh Circuit relied upon would become illusory. If that were the case, then the
[Court] would reconsider the conclusion that there is no habeas corpus release
remedy for the detainees.”88 Likewise, a court in the Middle District of Georgia
denied an emergency motion for preliminary injunctive relief but specifically noted
that it might reconsider habeas relief if conditions “cannot be modified to
reasonably eliminate those risks.”89
As preventative measures improve, it will become only more difficult to
demonstrate that there are no conditions of detention that would be constitutionally
sufficient. Therefore, it is especially important to consider whether any alternative
remedies to habeas exist as another rationale for extending habeas jurisdiction.
3. No Alternative Remedies Are Available
A completely different rationale given by a minority of district courts for
exercising habeas jurisdiction is that, without access to habeas, detained immigrants
“may have no vehicle by which to seek redress for the constitutional violations they
allege.”90 Some have stressed that a Bivens cause of action is not a viable alternative
because it provides a remedy of damages not a remedy of release.91 Others have
distinguished between a Bivens claim for damages and a Bivens claim for injunctive
relief (i.e., an implied cause of action under the Constitution for injunctive relief),

85. Benavides v. Gartland, No. 5:20-cv-46, 2020 WL 1914916, at *5 ( S.D. Ga. Apr. 18, 2020 ).
86. Acosta Ortega v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, No. 2:20-cv-00522, 2020 WL 4816373,
at *5 (D.N.M. Aug. 19, 2020 ).
87. See, e.g., Gayle v. Meade, No. 20-21553, 2020 WL 1949737, at *26 ( S.D. Fla. Apr. 22, 2020 ),
report and recommendation adopted in part, No. 20-21553-CIV, 2020 WL 2086482 ( S.D. Fla. Apr. 30, 2020 ),
order clarified, No. 20-21553-CIV, 2020 WL 2203576 ( S.D. Fla. May 2, 2020 ).
88. Id.
89. A.S.M. v. Donahue, No. 7:20-CV-62, 2020 WL 1847158, at *1 ( M.D. Ga. Apr. 10, 2020 ).
90. Coreas v. Bounds, 451 F. Supp. 3d 407, 419 (D. Md. 2020 ) ( citing Lee v. Winston, 717
F.2d 888, 892 (4th Cir. 1983 ) ).
91. Awshana v. Adducci, 453 F. Supp. 3d 1045, 1047 ( E.D. Mich. 2020 ); Angelica C. v. Immigr.
& Customs Enf’t, No. 20-cv-913, 2020 WL 3441461, at *10 (D. Minn. June 5, 2020 ), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 20-CV-913, 2020 WL 3429945 (D. Minn. June 23, 2020 ) (“Release is not a
remedy allowed for under a civil rights action.” ) ( citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 ( 1973 ) ).
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concluding that the petitioner could proceed with both a claim for injunctive relief
and a habeas petition.92
But many more courts have denied habeas jurisdiction reasoning that an
alternative civil rights remedy is available under either Bivens or Section 1983, relying
on the Supreme Court’s decision in Preiser.93 The courts that have reached this
conclusion have done so without actually analyzing the feasibility of a civil rights
claim under either Bivens or Section 1983. For example, a court in the District of
New Mexico found that the petitioner could not proceed with a habeas petition
challenging conditions “in lieu of filing a 1983 [claim] to correct unconstitutional
conditions of confinement,” but never discussed whether a Section 1983 claim
would actually be possible.94 Another court found that the petitioner could proceed
under Bivens, noting that “the unavailability of this preferred remedy [of release]
does not leave a plaintiff or a petitioner without any remedy,” but never analyzed
whether Bivens would actually be viable under the Supreme Court’s recent
precedents.95 Some district courts have even relied on tort-based remedies, either
under the FTCA or state tort law, as alternatives to habeas.96
The reasoning provided by courts regarding alternative remedies is generally
very cursory and ignores serious structural barriers that prevent immigration
detainees from bringing civil rights and tort claims to challenge their detention
conditions. The following Section examines these other remedies in detail and
argues that they are not meaningful alternatives for many detained immigrants.
II. CIVIL RIGHTS REMEDIES AS POTENTIAL ALTERNATIVES
The argument that habeas is not available to challenge conditions of
confinement because those claims should be brought as civil rights actions breaks
down if a civil rights action is not actually viable. As explained below, a Section 1983
claim, which requires state action, often is not viable for federal immigration
detainees, even if they are detained in local jails or in privately operated
92. See, e.g., David Q. v. Tsoukaris, No. 20-7176, 2020 WL 4382282, at *9 (D.N.J. July 30, 2020 );
Romeo S.K. v. Tsoukaris, No. 20-5512, 2020 WL 4364297, at *7 (D.N.J. July 29, 2020 ) ( citing Woodall
v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 242 n.3 ( 3d Cir. 2005 ); see also Alirio R.R. v. Correia,
No. 20-6217, 2020 WL 3249109, at *5 ( D.N.J. June 16, 2020 ) ( finding that “at a minimum,” a detained
immigrant vulnerable to COVID-19 must “be able to proceed under either [ the habeas statute ]
or Bivens” ).
93. See, e.g., Toure v. Hott, 458 F. Supp. 3d 387, 400 ( E.D. Va. 2020 ) ( citing Glaus v. Anderson,
408 F.3d 382, 387 (7th Cir. 2005 )); see also Ibarra-Perez v. Howard, 468 F. Supp. 3d 1156, 1170
( D. Ariz. 2020 ) ( “Were the Court forced to answer the question, it would rule that Counts Two, Three,
and Four of the Petition are subject to dismissal because they are not cognizable in a § 2241 action.” );
Umarbaev v. Moore, No. 3:20-CV-1279, 2020 WL 3051448 ( N.D. Tex. June 6, 2020 ); Shah v. Wolf,
No. 3:20-CV-994, 2020 WL 4456530 ( N.D. Tex. July 13, 2020 ).
94. Acosta Ortega v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, No. 2:20-cv-00522, 2020 WL 4816373, at
*4–5 ( D.N.M. Aug. 19, 2020 ) (“Petitioner has not shown cause why the Court could not order ( in a
Section 1983 case) improvements to his conditions of confinement.” ).
95. Toure, 458 F. Supp. 3d at 400 ( citing Glaus, 408 F.3d at 387 ).
96. See, e.g., Umarbaev, 2020 WL 3051448.
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detention centers pursuant to a contract with the municipality. A Bivens claim for
damages may also not be feasible after the Supreme Court’s decisions in Abbasi
and Hernandez.97
A. Section 1983 Claims
Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was enacted after the Civil War
“to provide a federal forum for civil rights claims.”98 Section 1983 encompasses
claims for damages, as well as for injunctive and declaratory relief, based on the
deprivation of a federal constitutional or statutory right by persons acting under
color of state law.99 Liability “attaches only to those wrongdoers ‘who carry a badge
of authority of a State and represent it in some capacity, whether they act in
accordance with their authority or misuse it.’”100 In other words, the defendant must
have “exercised power ‘possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only
because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.’”101
The defendants must also be personally involved in the alleged violation.102 In
Monell, the Supreme Court held that municipalities cannot be held liable under
Section 1983 based only on a theory of respondeat superior (vicarious liability).103
Some appellate courts have held that where the claim is against a municipality, the
plaintiff must show that a policy or custom of the municipality was the “moving
force” behind the deprivation of plaintiff’s rights.104 Appellate courts have applied
Monell’s prohibition on vicarious liability under Section 1983 to private corporations
as well.105

97. See generally Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735 ( 2020 ); Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 ( 2017 ).
98. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 ( 1989 ); see also Nicole B. Godfrey, Holding
Federal Prison Officials Accountable: The Case for Recognizing a Damages Remedy for Federal Prisoners’ Free Exercise
Claims, 96 NEB. L. REV. 924, 931 ( 2018 ).
99. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 50−51 ( 1988 ) ( holding that medical
professionals who provide care to inmates in prison settings are acting under color of state law ); Maine
v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4–8 ( 1980 ) ( holding that Section 1983 encompasses violations of purely
statutory federal law, not just constitutional law ). Congress can prohibit recourse to Section 1983 in
legislation or by creating a comprehensive statutory scheme that is incompatible with individual
enforcement under Section 1983. See Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 341 ( 1997 ).
100. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988 ) ( quoting Monroe
v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 ( 1961 ) ).
101. West, 487 U.S. at 49 ( quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 ( 1941 ) ).
102. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 ( 1978 ).
103. Id.
104. Miller v. Sanilac Cnty., 606 F.3d 240, 255 (6th Cir. 2010 ) (quoting Powers v. Hamilton
Cnty. Pub. Defender Comm’n, 501 F.3d 592, 606–07 ( 6th Cir. 2007 )). Some courts have allowed
Section 1983 actions against municipalities in cases involving their response to detainer requests from
ICE, but that is a distinct issue from challenges to the conditions of immigration detention. See,
e.g., Creedle v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 349 F. Supp. 3d 1276, 1308–09 ( S.D. Fla. 2018 ); Abriq v. Hall, 295
F. Supp. 3d 874, 878 ( M.D. Tenn. 2018 ).
105. See, e.g., Shields v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 746 F.3d 782 ( 7th Cir. 2014 ) ( explaining that all
circuits that have considered the issue have applied Monell to private corporations but questioning
whether that is based on sound reasoning ).
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Traditionally, Section 1983 claims pertaining to detention are brought by state
prisoners against state, city, or county officials or municipalities.106 Immigration
detainees are in the custody of ICE, a federal agency that acts exclusively under
color of federal law. ICE officers cannot be sued under Section 1983 because they
are not acting under color of state law.107 However, as explained in Part I, about
thirty percent of immigration detainees are held in facilities that are operated either
by cities or counties, and approximately seventy percent are in facilities that are
privately operated.108 If a detained noncitizen brings a Section 1983 claim against
employees of these municipal or private operators, a critical threshold question is
whether the defendants acted under color of state law.109 This state law inquiry is
fact-specific and requires examining “whether the State was sufficiently involved to
treat the decisive conduct as state action.”110 This Section first examines challenges
to bringing Section 1983 claims against detention facilities operated by local
governments and then at privately operated facilities.
1. Detention Facilities Operated by State or Local Governments
If an individual in federal custody is held in a city or county jail pursuant to a
contract between the federal and municipal government, a key question is whether
the person who allegedly violated the Constitution acted under color of state or
federal law. When the “challenged action by state employees is nothing more than
the application of federal rules, the federal involvement in those actions is so
pervasive that the actions are taken under color of federal and not state law.”111
Under this standard, if the officials at a city or county jail are simply applying ICE’s
rules, such as ICE’s COVID-19 Pandemic Response Requirements (PRR), a court
may well conclude that the defendants were acting under color of federal law, not
state law, and that there is therefore no liability under Section 1983.

106. See Martin A. Schwartz, The Preiser Puzzle: Continued Frustrating Conflict Between the Civil Rights
and Habeas Corpus Remedies for State Prisoners, 37 DEPAUL L. REV. 85, 86 n.4, 98 ( 1988 ) ( focusing on
state prisoners because “the section 1983-habeas corpus issue normally arises in cases brought by
confined state prisoners who are clearly in custody” but acknowledging that the issue may also arise in
other contexts ).
107. Id. at 86 n.4 (“Federal prisoners in federal custody may not seek relief against federal prison
officials under section 1983 because these officials do not act under color of state law within the
meaning of section 1983.” ( citing MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ & JOHN E. KIRKLIN, SECTION 1983
LITIGATIONS: CLAIMS, DEFENSES AND FEES § 5.6 ( 1986 ) ) ).
108. See FREEDOM FOR IMMIGRANTS, supra note 16.
109. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988 ) ( quoting Monroe
v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 192 ( 1961 ) ).
110. Id.
111. Rosas v. Brock, 826 F.2d 1004, 1007 ( 11th Cir. 1987 ); see also Askew v. Bloemker, 548
F.2d 673, 677 (7th Cir. 1976 ) ( finding no state action in a raid conducted by officers employed by both
federal and state agencies where the raid was completely instigated and controlled by the federal agency
and occurred outside the state agency’s jurisdiction ).
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But courts have also found that “[a] crucial inquiry is ‘whether day-to-day
operations are supervised by the Federal [or state] government.’”112 Under this test,
courts may find state action when a federal detainee is held in a state or local jail.
For example, in a 1974 case involving a federal prisoner in a city jail, the Fifth Circuit
reversed the district court’s finding that the city jail was not “acting under color of
State law, but [was] providing for the . . . safekeeping of the plaintiff in accordance
with [a] Federal Contract.”113 The Fifth Circuit found that the proper focus of the
inquiry was “not on the particular circumstances which brought the plaintiff under
state control, but rather on the fact of that control and the manner of its exercise.”114
In that case, the federal contract did not authorize federal interference with the
operation of the jail, and the jail officials supervised the plaintiff “by virtue of the
positions conferred on them [under state law],” which led the court to conclude that
they were state actors under Section 1983.115
Some courts have applied similar reasoning to cases involving detained
immigrants. For instance, in Newborgh, which involved the death of an immigration
detainee due to inadequate medical care, a court in the Eastern District of Virginia
found state action by the jail authority, reasoning that it had “substantial control
over its own operations.”116 In Jarno, a court in the same district also found state
action where the immigration detainee alleged excessive force by the jail guards,
reasoning that the federal contract did not specify how the jail should supervise
its guards and that immigration detainees were not segregated from the jail’s
general population.117
With respect to detention conditions related to the COVID-19 pandemic,
however, ICE issued PRR that apply to all facilities.118 ICE’s heavy involvement in
developing measures for infection prevention and control, monitoring facilities, and
requiring corrective plans where needed may lead courts to conclude that there is
no state action when it comes to claims based on conditions related to COVID-19,
even when the noncitizen is detained in a city or county jail. For example, the PRR
provide that ICE will “conduct onsite in-person monthly spot checks” at detention
facilities, provide written notice “[u]pon identification of a deficiency,” and allow
seven days for submission of a corrective action plan to ICE for approval.119 The
112. Johnson v. Orr, 780 F.2d 386, 390 (3d Cir. 1986 ) ( emphasis added ) ( citing Detore
v. Loc. 245 Jersey City Pub. Emps. Union, 615 F.2d 980, 983 ( 3d Cir. 1980 ) ).
113. Henderson v. Thrower, 497 F.2d 125, 125 ( 5th Cir. 1974 ) ( per curiam ).
114. Id. at 125–26.
115. Id. at 126.
116. Newbrough v. Piedmont Reg’l Jail Auth., 822 F. Supp. 2d 558, 573–74 ( E.D. Va. 2011 ),
vacated in part, No. 3:10CV867, 2012 WL 12931710 ( E.D. Va. 2012 ).
117. Jarno v. Lewis, 256 F. Supp. 2d 499, 503 ( E.D. Va. 2003 ).
118. See generally U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, ENFORCEMENT AND
R EMOVAL OPERATIONS , COVID-19 P ANDEMIC R ESPONSE R EQUIREMENTS ( Version 7.0,
Oct. 19, 2021 ).
119. Id. at 8 ( stating that if it is a “[ l ]ife/safety issue,” then the corrective plan must be submitted
within three days).
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PRR also provide consequences for facilities that fail to take corrective steps.120 For
ICE-dedicated facilities, sanctions could include contract payment deductions, fixed
fee deductions, or other types of nonpayment, and ultimately ICE could decide to
terminate or not renew the contract.121 For nondedicated facilities, ICE could
decide to reduce its detained population at the facility or remove it altogether, on
either a temporary or permanent basis.122
Additionally, the PRR require detention center operators to report all
suspected and confirmed cases of COVID-19 to ICE, evaluate all new admissions
to determine if they are at risk of serious illness from COVID-19, and notify ICE
of the results of those evaluations.123 ICE has also mandated facility operators to
ensure sufficient supplies of hygiene products such as soap and hand sanitizer,
facemasks and other personal protective equipment, and medical supplies.124
Among other requirements are rules pertaining to testing, managing suspected and
confirmed cases, and contingency plans for staffing.125 This level of supervision
and involvement by ICE may lead courts to conclude that any constitutional
deprivations related to COVID-19 were based on federal action, not state action.
This is not to say that all arguments regarding state action are foreclosed.
Arguments can still be made based on important decisions that the PRR leave to
the facility operator’s discretion. For example, the PRR state that COVID-19
screening should take place before entering the facility or just inside the facility
“where practicable”; social distancing measures should be undertaken “to the extent
practicable”; and facilities should “adopt the most effective cohorting methods
practicable.”126 Furthermore, the PRR encourage facilities to make “efforts” to
quarantine all new admissions and test all new intakes upon arrival, as well as
to make “every possible effort” to isolate individuals suspected of having
COVID-19.127 When punitive solitary confinement cells are used for medical
isolation, “efforts” should be made to provide similar access to the amenities
(e.g., TV, reading materials, and commissary) available in the regular housing
units.128 Because this language is discretionary, not mandatory, it leaves some room
for state action.
If the state action requirement were met, the doctrine of qualified immunity
could prevent any remedy of damages, but it is not a defense in cases seeking
injunctive relief.129 The qualified immunity doctrine “strikes a balance between
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
( 1982 ); see

Id. at 8–9.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 8–9.
Id. at 9–14.
Id. at 30–32.
Id. at 39–45.
Id. at 35, 38–39.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 22.
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 242 (2009 ); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806
also John C. Jeffries, Jr., Disaggregating Constitutional Torts, 110 YALE L.J. 259, 263 ( 2000)
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compensating those who have been injured by official conduct and protecting
government’s ability to perform its traditional functions.”130 Immunity is meant to
“safeguard government, and thereby to protect the public at large, not to benefit its
agents.”131 Section 1983 therefore allows damages against state officials in their
personal capacity only when their conduct “violate[s] clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”132 In other
words, state officials have immunity from damages when the law is uncertain.133
Because the pandemic presents a new and dynamic situation, judges may be
reluctant to find that conduct related to detention conditions and COVID-19
violates a clearly established constitutional right, foreclosing damages as a remedy.
However, injunctive relief under Section 1983 would still be available.
2. Detention Facilities Operated by Private Companies
Cases involving noncitizens in ICE custody who are being held in privately
operated detention facilities raise even more complicated issues. When ICE
enters into Intergovernmental Service Agreements (IGSA) with state or local
governments, the actual operation of the detention center may be subcontracted to
a private company.134 Although the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has
noted that “ICE data does not allow us to reliably identify how many IGSAs are
operated by private detention companies,” GAO found that “as of the end of fiscal
year 2019, at least 31 of the 108 IGSA facilities ICE used to hold detainees were
operated by private operators.”135 Courts have held that private individuals,
including employees of private prison companies, acting under a contract with a
state to perform a traditional public function may be acting under color of state
law.136 In Malesko, where the Supreme Court declined to expand a Bivens damages
( arguing that the law of qualified immunity should be “refined and rethought” and explaining that
“qualified immunity precludes damages for a substantial range of constitutional violations, especially
where the underlying standards are murky or unclear” ).
130. Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 167 (1992 ) ( citing Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819 ).
131. Id. at 168.
132. Wilson v. Lane, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999 ) ( quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 ).
133. Pamela S. Karlan, The Irony of Immunity: The Eleventh Amendment, Irreparable Injury, and Section
1983, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1311, 1323 ( 2001 ); John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional
Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87 ( 1999 ) ( explaining that this distinction may contribute to the progressive
development of constitutional rights ); Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Sovereign Immunity, Due Process,
and the Alden Trilogy, 109 YALE L.J. 1927, 1931–43 ( 2000 ) ( discussing Alden’s contribution to the
right-remedy gap ).
134. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF ., GAO-21-149, IMMIGRATION
DETENTION: ACTIONS NEEDED TO IMPROVE PLANNING, DOCUMENTATION, AND OVERSIGHT OF
DETENTION FACILITY CONTRACTS 7, 11, 15–17 (2021 ). While ICE also contracts directly with private
companies to operate detention centers, these so-called “Contract Detention Facilities” (CDFs ) hold
only 16% of the average daily detained population, compared to 55% in facilities operated under IGSAs.
Id. at 11.
135. Id. at 17.
136. Rosborough v. Mgmt. & Training Corp., 350 F.3d 459, 461 ( 5th Cir. 2003 ) ( per curiam )
( finding that private prison firms and their employees are state actors ); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am.,
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action to private correctional companies, it specifically noted that state prisoners
“already enjoy a right of action against private correctional providers under
42 U.S.C. 1983.”137
But there is a significant difference between private operators of state prisons
and private operators of federal immigration detention centers, especially if the
immigration detention center only holds immigration detainees. As of August 3,
2020, ICE’s forty-four dedicated facilities had a total average daily population of
37,332, while the nondedicated facilities had a total average daily population of only
10,696. Consequently, if the private operators of ICE-dedicated facilities are
considered to be acting under color of federal law, then seventy-eight percent of
immigration detainees will be barred from Section 1983 claims due to the state
action requirement.
In several cases involving ICE-dedicated detention facilities, courts have
found that the privately operated detention facilities were performing a federal
function, not a state function, even though the private company had a contract with
the municipality.138 For example, in Doe v. United States, the Fifth Circuit considered
a case involving eight female immigration detainees who were sexually assaulted
while being transported from the Hutto Detention Facility in Texas, which was
operated by the Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) pursuant to a contract
with the county.139 The court applied a “public function” test to determine if CCA’s
actions were “fairly attributable to the State.”140 The court concluded that CCA was
performing a federal function in “detaining aliens pending a determination of their
immigration status pursuant to ICE specification” and that the county had almost
no involvement in the detention center’s day-to-day operations.141 Accordingly, the
court dismissed the Section 1983 claim against CCA.
Similarly, in another case involving the ICE-dedicated Hutto facility in Texas,
the district court found “no dispute that CCA carried out purely federal functions,”
noting that the “sole purpose” of that facility was to “detain aliens pending a
102 F.3d 810, 814 ( 6th Cir. 1996 ) ( same ); Palm v. Marr, 174 F. Supp. 2d 484, 487–88 (N.D. Tex. 2001 )
( same ); Giron v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 14 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1250 ( D.N.M. 1998 ) ( holding that a private
prison employee was a state actor subject to Section 1983 suit ); cf. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457
U.S. 922, 941–42 ( 1982 ) ( permitting suit under Section 1983 against private corporations exercising
state action ).
137. Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 71–72 n.5 (2001 ); cf. Richardson v. McKnight,
521 U.S. 399, 413 ( 1997 ) ( declining to decide whether private prison guards actually acted “under color
of law” and were therefore liable under Section 1983 ).
138. See Doe v. United States, 831 F.3d 309, 313 ( 5th Cir. 2016 ); Doe v. Neveleff,
No. A–11–CV–907, 2013 WL 489442, at *13 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 8, 2013 ); Guzman-Martinez
v. Corr. Corp. of Am., No. CV–11–02390, 2012 WL 5907081, at *11 (D. Ariz. Nov. 26, 2012 );
Fabian v. Dunn, No. SA–08–cv–269, 2009 WL 2461207, at *5 ( W.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2009 ); Jama
v. U.S. Immigr. & Naturalization Servs., 343 F. Supp. 2d 338, 362 ( D.N.J. 2004 ); United States
v. Thomas, 240 F.3d 445, 447–48 (5th Cir. 2001 ).
139. Doe, 831 F.3d at 313.
140. Id. at 314–16.
141. Id. at 316.
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determination of their immigration status.”142 The court pointed out that “[w]hile
maintaining a jail may at times be both a federal and state function, maintaining an
immigrant detention facility is a purely federal function,” stressing that “[n]either
CCA nor Williamson County could run an immigration detention facility without
the imprimatur of ICE.”143
A district court reached the same conclusion about the Eloy Detention Center,
another ICE-dedicated facility operated by CCA pursuant to a contract with the city
of Eloy, Arizona. The court reasoned that “[e]ven if the contract between the City
and CCA imposed extensive regulation and provided governmental funding, it
would be insufficient to establish joint action,” since “[t]he contract merely acted
as a conduit for transferring regulation and funding from ICE to CCA.”144 Other
cases have likewise held that the private operators of immigration detention centers
are federal actors, since “the power to detain immigrants is derived solely and
exclusively from federal authority.”145
Immigration detainees have the best chance of establishing state action in
cases against the employees of private correctional companies if the facility is not
dedicated to ICE, meaning it holds both state prisoners and federal ICE detainees.
In a case involving a federal prisoner who was detained at a county jail that held
both state and federal prisoners, a court in the Western District of Texas held that
a private correctional company, The GEO Group, could be sued under Section
1983.146 The court found that the county had contracted with The GEO Group
to perform a function that was “traditionally the exclusive providence of the
state—confinement of prisoners—specifically, for the operation of the jail.”
Although the county also had a contract with the U.S. Marshals Service to house
federal prisoners, the court concluded that the federal contract did not change the
character of The GEO Group’s function. By contrast, when a federal prisoner in a
GEO Group-operated Bureau of Prisons facility dedicated exclusively to federal

142. Doe, 2013 WL 489442, at *13; see also Doe v. Neveleff, No. A-11-CV-907, 2013 WL
12098684 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 12, 2013 ) ( adopting report and recommendation of magistrate judge ).
143. Doe, 2013 WL 489442, at *14.
144. Guzman-Martinez v. Corr. Corp. of Am., No. CV–11–02390, 2012 WL 5907081, at *11
( D. Ariz. Nov. 26, 2012 ).
145. See, e.g., Fabian v. Dunn, No. SA–08–cv–269, 2009 WL 2461207, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 6,
2009 ) ( rejecting the argument that the employees of the private company operating the immigration
detention center were state actors ); Jama v. U.S. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 343 F. Supp. 2d 338,
362 ( D.N.J. 2004 ) ( holding that the private company’s employees “were federal actors because they
were employees of a corporation performing governmental functions pursuant to a contract with the
INS” ); United States v. Thomas, 240 F.3d 445, 447–48 ( 5th Cir. 2001 ) ( holding that a guard at CCA
facility, which contracted with INS to hold immigration detainees, was a “person acting for or on behalf
of the United States” because he performed same duties and had same responsibilities as a federal
corrections officer employed at a federal prison facility ).
146. Alvarez v. Geo Group, Inc., No. SA-09-CV-0299, 2010 WL 743752, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 1,
2020 ).
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prisoners filed a lawsuit under Section 1983, a court in the Western District of Texas
found no state action.147
In short, for the twenty-two percent of immigration detainees in
non-dedicated facilities that are privately operated, there may be some chance of
satisfying Section 1983’s state action requirement. However, for the remaining
seventy-eight percent in privately operated ICE-dedicated facilities, the mere
existence of a contract with the local government would not be enough to show
state action and liability under Section 1983 would be foreclosed. Thus, even though
the employees of private correctional companies do not enjoy qualified
immunity,148 they will nevertheless be protected from liability under Section 1983
for constitutional violations in ICE-dedicated facilities because their actions would
not be “under color of state law.”
B. Bivens Actions
Given the challenge in showing state action under Section 1983, it would seem
logical to bring a Bivens action. In Bivens, the Supreme Court recognized an implied
right of action to compensate a plaintiff whose constitutional rights were violated
by federal agents, creating a federal counterpart to Section 1983.149 However, this
avenue is also obstructed for numerous reasons. To begin with, the Supreme Court
has declined to extend Bivens to a federal agency, emphasizing that “the purpose of
Bivens is to deter the officer,” not the agency.150 Additionally, the Court has declined
to extend Bivens to private corporations or their employees involved in operating
federal prisons or programs that contract with the Bureau of Prisons.151
147. See generally Barnett v. Geo Group, Inc., No. 1:15-CV-224, 2017 WL 3896363
( N.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 2017 ).
148. Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 409–13 (1997 ) ( holding that
“private prison guards, unlike those who work directly for the government, do not
enjoy immunity from suit in a Section 1983 case” ). A separate question is whether private health care
professionals who provide medical care to incarcerated individuals are entitled to qualified immunity
under Section 1983. The Supreme Court has not directly addressed that issue, but it has found that a
private attorney retained by a city was entitled to qualified immunity. See Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377,
393–94 (2012 ). In the context of private health care providers in prisons, however, several appellate
courts have found no qualified immunity under Section 1983. See, e.g., Estate of Clark v. Walker, 865
F.3d 544 (7th Cir. 2017 ); McCullum v. Tepe, 693 F.3d 696 ( 6th Cir. 2012 ); Halvorsen v. Baird, 146
F.3d 680 ( 9th Cir. 1998 ); see also Spencer Bruck, Note, The Impact of Constitutional Liability and Private
Contracting on Health Care Services for Immigrants in Civil Detention, 25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 487, 499–503
( 2011 ) (arguing that immigration detainees can bring Section 1983 claims against private medical
providers ). But see Leeks v. Cunningham, 997 F.2d 1330, 1336 (11th Cir. 1993 ) ( per curiam ) ( holding
that a private physician under contract to provide medical services to a county jail was entitled to
qualified immunity in a case predating Richardson ).
149. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389
( 1971 ) ( creating an implied right of action for an injured plaintiff to sue federal officers for a violation
of the Fourth Amendment ).
150. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 485 (1994 ).
151. Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 71–74 ( 2001 ) ( declining to extend Bivens to a
private company that had a contract with the BOP to operate a halfway house for federal prisoners );
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Consequently, ICE as an agency cannot be sued under a Bivens action. Nor can any
of the private companies that operate immigration detention centers or their
employees be sued under Bivens.152 This leaves only individual ICE officers or
possibly state or local officers who are found to be acting under color of federal law
as potential defendants in a Bivens action.
The greatest impediment to a Bivens claim, however, is that the Supreme Court
has applied Bivens narrowly to only a few contexts.153 The Bivens case itself involved
a Fourth Amendment claim based on unreasonable search and seizure by the
Federal Bureau of Narcotics.154 Subsequently, in Davis, the Court recognized a Fifth
Amendment equal protection claim based on gender discrimination in
employment.155 The following year, in Carlson, the Court recognized an Eighth
Amendment claim based on federal officials’ failure to provide a prisoner with
adequate medical care.156 Since Carlson, the Supreme Court has declined to extend
Bivens ten times, most recently in Abbasi and Hernandez.157
Abbasi clarified the Bivens analysis by setting forth a two-step framework.158
First, the court must determine if the claim arises in a “new Bivens context,” which
requires determining if “the case is different in a meaningful way from previous
Bivens cases.”159 Even a minor extension is considered an extension of Bivens.160 A
different constitutional right, a different statutory regime, or different defendants
can all render a context meaningfully different than prior cases.161 If the claim arises
in a new context, the second step in the Bivens analysis is for the court to determine
if there are any alternative remedies or “special factors” counseling hesitation in
extending Bivens to the new context.162
The inquiry regarding “special factors” asks whether “there are sound reasons
to think Congress might doubt the efficacy or necessity of a damages remedy.”163
The focus is on separation-of-powers concerns, as the court must decide “whether

Minneci v. Pollard, 565 U.S. 118, 131 (2012 ) ( declining to extend Bivens to the employees of a private
correctional company ).
152. See Malesko, 534 U.S. at 71–74; Minneci, 565 U.S. at 131.
153. See generally Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 ( 1979 ); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 ( 1980 ).
154. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389–92.
155. See generally Davis, 442 U.S. 228 ( holding that the Fifth Amendment provided a damages
remedy for a claim of gender discrimination ).
156. See generally Green, 446 U.S. 14 ( allowing a prisoner’s estate to pursue an Eighth Amendment
claim that federal officials failed to provide adequate medical care, resulting in the prisoner’s death ).
157. Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 743–50 ( 2020 ); Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1857
( 2017 ) ( collecting the eight additional cases ).
158. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843.
159. Id. at 1864.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1864–65; see also Leading Case, Bivens Actions––Ziglar v. Abbasi, 131 HARV. L. REV. 313,
318 (2017 ) ( “The new context inquiry is quite exacting . . . .” ).
162. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396
( 1971 ); Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1857–60.
163. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1858.
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the Judiciary is well suited, absent congressional action or inaction, to consider and
weigh the costs and benefits of allowing a damages action to proceed.”164 The Court
has repeatedly stressed that “expanding the Bivens remedy is now a ‘disfavored’
judicial activity.”165 With respect to alternative remedies, the Court held in Carlson
that the FTCA was not an adequate alternative remedy to Bivens, but in Malesko and
Minneci, it deemed state tort law remedies to be adequate alternatives. Both steps of
the Bivens analysis therefore present obstacles for noncitizens challenging the
conditions of immigration detention.
1. New Context
The plaintiffs in Abbasi were noncitizens detained after the 9/11 attacks
pending a determination of whether they had connections to terrorism.166 They
argued that the detention policy implemented by federal officials violated their Fifth
Amendment due process and equal protection rights by keeping them in restrictive
conditions of confinement based on their race, religion, ethnicity, or national
origin.167 The Court also noted that although the harsh detention conditions at
issue were “as compelling as those at issue in Carlson,” the case presented a new
context because “Carlson was predicated on the Eighth Amendment and this
claim is predicated on the Fifth.”168 Additionally, the Court found a new context
because, unlike prior Bivens cases, Abbasi involved a challenge to “high level
executive policy.”169
The Supreme Court again declined to extend a Bivens damages remedy in
Hernandez v. Mesa, which involved a cross-border shooting that gave rise to Fourth
and Fifth Amendment excessive force challenges.170 There, the Court stressed that
“[a] claim may arise in a new context even if it is based on the same constitutional
provision as a claim in a case in which a damages remedy was previously
recognized.”171 Cases involving a “new category of defendants” are also considered
an extension.172 The Court found that the cross-border shooting of a Mexican boy
by a Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officer was a “glaringly obvious” new
context, even though it involved Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims like the Bivens
case itself.173
Since Abbasi, almost all of the cases that were found to arise in the same
context as prior Bivens cases involve a context that is identical to one of the Supreme
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id.
Id. at 1857.
Id. at 1851–52.
Id. at 1853, 1858.
Id. at 1864.
Id. at 1860.
Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 743 (2020 ).
Id.
Id. (quoting Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 68 ( 2001 ) ).
Id. at 743–44.
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Court precedents.174 Courts examining Bivens claims in cases involving the due
process rights of noncitizens in immigration detention have generally found that
this is a new context.175 Noncitizen plaintiffs have argued that Davis and Carlson
together establish a Bivens remedy in this context, but courts have rejected that
argument, since neither of those cases “dealt with the rights of noncitizens in
immigration detention.”176 One court noted that this question was not even a
“close call.”177
Several circuit courts178 and various district courts179 have found that Bivens
claims against immigration officials present a new context.180 In Tun-Cos, for
example, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that the case presented a new Bivens context
because the ICE officers were a new category of defendants not previously
recognized in Bivens claims, they were enforcing immigration laws rather than
criminal laws, and the plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment claims had “no analogue” in the
Supreme Court’s prior Bivens precedents, since Davis involved an equal protection
challenge in the employment context.181
Given these precedents, a challenge to immigration detentions related to the
COVID-19 pandemic would almost certainly be considered a new context. To the
extent the challenge involved immigration detention policies, it would be foreclosed
by Abbasi. Like Hernandez, the claim would also be against a new category of federal
officers, ICE agents. Even if the claim were based on the Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause like prior Bivens precedents, Hernandez made it clear that this would
not be enough to make it the same context. Because a pandemic-related
constitutional claim by someone in immigration detention would present a new
context, courts would need to turn to the second step in the analysis.

174. Ojo v. United States, 364 F. Supp. 3d 163, 173 ( E.D.N.Y. 2019 ) ( noting that the court
was aware of only one non-identical Bivens claim that was found to arise in the same context ).
175. See, e.g., K.O. v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 468 F. Supp. 3d 350, 364–65 ( D.D.C.
2020 ), appeal docketed sub nom. K.O. v. Sessions, No. 20-5255 ( D.C. Cir. filed Aug. 26, 2020 ).
176. Id. at 364.
177. Id. at 365.
178. See, e.g., Tun-Cos v. Perrotte, 922 F.3d 514, 525–28 ( 4th Cir. 2019 ); Rroku v. Cole, 726
F. App’x 201, 206 ( 5th Cir. 2018 ) (per curiam ); Alvarez v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 818 F.3d
1194, 1206 ( 11th Cir. 2016 ); Mirmehdi v. United States, 689 F.3d 975, 981 ( 9th Cir. 2012 ).
179. See, e.g., Elhady v. Pew, 370 F. Supp. 3d 757, 768 ( E.D. Mich. 2019 ) ( finding that a Fifth
Amendment claim to be free from non-punitive conditions and abuse by CBP officers was a new
context under Bivens, but that special factors did not exist counseling hesitation ); cf. Linlor v. Polson,
263 F. Supp. 3d 613, 620 ( E.D. Va. 2017 ) ( finding a new Bivens context where the right at issue was a
Fourth Amendment violation by a TSA officer ); Cuevas v. United States, No. 16-cv-00299, 2018 WL
1399910, at *4 (D. Colo. Mar. 19, 2018 ) ( finding a new Bivens context where the right at issue was a
non-medical Eighth Amendment claim ).
180. Peña Arita v. United States, 470 F. Supp. 3d 663, 694–96 ( S.D. Tex. 2020 ).
181. Tun-Cos, 922 F.3d at 525 ( citing Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 230–31 ( 1979 ) ); see also
Medina v. Danaher, 445 F. Supp. 3d 1367, 1371 ( D. Colo. 2020 ) ( following the reasoning in Tun-Cos ).
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2. Special Factors and Alternative Remedies
Under the second step in the Bivens framework, a court must ask whether any
alternative remedy is available and if there are any “special factors” that counsel
hesitation.182 In cases touching on immigration, courts have generally found the
existence of special factors based on sensitive issues of national security, diplomacy,
and foreign policy, as well as separation-of-powers concerns related to Congress’s
comprehensive legislation in the area of immigration.183
Even before Abbasi and Hernandez, several circuits refused to recognize Bivens
actions in the immigration enforcement context based on the existence of “special
factors.”184 In Mirmehdi, the Ninth Circuit concluded that “[t]he complexity and
comprehensiveness of the existing remedial system” and the tendency of
immigration issues to affect national security are special factors counseling
hesitation.185 Similarly, in Alvarez, the Eleventh Circuit described “the breadth and
detail of the Immigration and Nationality Act” and “the importance of
demonstrating due respect for the Constitution’s separation of powers” as special
factors counseling hesitation.186 And in Tun-Cos, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that
“immigration enforcement . . . has the natural tendency to affect diplomacy,
foreign policy, and the security of the nation, which . . . counsel hesitation in
extending Bivens.”187
Similarly, in Maria S., the Fifth Circuit found that “judicial meddling in
immigration matters is particularly violative of separation-of-powers principles.”188
There, the Fifth Circuit noted that “[d]espite its repeated and careful attention
to immigration matters, Congress has declined to authorize damage remedies
against individual agents involved in civil immigration enforcement.”189 The court
found that “the institutional silence speaks volumes and counsels strongly against
judicial usurpation of the legislative function.”190
182. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396
( 1971 ); Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1857–60 (2017 ).
183. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1861.
184. See Mirmehdi v. United States, 689 F.3d 975, 982 (9th Cir. 2012 ); Alvarez v. U.S. Immigr. &
Customs Enf’t, 818 F.3d 1194, 1210 (11th Cir. 2016 ); Tun-Cos v. Perrotte, 922 F.3d 514, 525–28
( 4th Cir. 2019 ); Maria S. ex rel. E.H.F. v. Garza, 912 F.3d 778, 784 ( 5th Cir. 2019 ).
185. Mirmehdi, 689 F.3d at 982. But cf. Lanuza v. Love, 899 F.3d 1019, 1027, 1032 ( 9th Cir. 2018 )
( holding that special factors did not preclude a Bivens remedy for “an individual attorney’s violation of
[ plaintiff’s ] due process rights in a routine immigration proceeding” by submitting false evidence
because “[ j ]udges are particularly well-equipped to weigh the costs of constitutional violations that
threaten the credibility of our judicial system” ).
186. Alvarez, 818 F.3d at 1210.
187. Tun-Cos v. Perrotte, 922 F.3d 514, 525 ( 4th Cir. 2019 ) ( quoting Mirmehdi, 689
F.3d at 983 ).
188. Maria S., 912 F.3d at 784.
189. Id. (quoting De La Paz v. Coy, 786 F.3d 367, 377 (5th Cir. 2015 ) ).
190. Id. District court decisions in other circuits reflect similar reasoning. For example, in El
Badrawi, the District Court in Connecticut held that special factors prohibited a Bivens claim by a
noncitizen against ICE agents who arrested him on suspected immigration violations, as the case would
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Post Abbasi, the arguments against extending Bivens are even stronger. Abbasi
stressed that Bivens suits are inappropriate to challenge executive branch policies
and specifically declined to extend Bivens to detention policy challenges, expressing
concern about the sensitive discovery that would be involved in this type of
action.191 The Court explained that Bivens claims are intended to be “brought against
the individual official for his or her own acts, not the acts of others.”192
Because the COVID-19-related immigration detention challenges generally
pertain to ICE policies, not the conduct of individual officials, it is highly unlikely
that courts will extend a Bivens remedy to this context. As in Abbasi, adjudicating a
Bivens claim in this context may require courts “to interfere in an intrusive way with
sensitive functions of the Executive Branch.”193 In Lanuza, where the Ninth Circuit
extended a Bivens claim related to an “individual attorney’s violation of [plaintiff’s]
due process rights in a routine immigration proceeding” by submitting false
evidence, the court stressed the difference between a challenge to the acts of an
individual officer and one that ultimately seeks to alter a policy.194
Additionally, the Court in Abbasi found it relevant to consider whether
Congress has given “frequent and intense” attention to the statutory
regime at issue.195 The fact that Congress has enacted extensive immigration
legislation without providing for a damages remedy will likely weigh against
extending Bivens to this context.196 However, as one district court noted, “although
the INA contains a comprehensive scheme governing the appeal of removal
proceedings and the Attorney General’s discretionary decisions, it does not provide
a remedial scheme for violations committed by immigration officials outside of
removal proceedings.”197
Immigration detention also involves discretionary decisions by officials within
the executive branch, including ICE officers and immigration judges who make

intrude on the executive’s authority to make determinations relating to national security and affect
the government’s relationship with foreign powers. El Badrawi v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 579
F. Supp. 2d 249, 264 ( D. Conn. 2008 ).
191. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1860 ( 2017 ); see also Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534
U.S. 61, 74 ( 2001 ) ( explaining that the Court has “never considered [ Bivens] a proper vehicle for altering
an entity’s policy,” whereas “injunctive relief has long been recognized as the proper means for
preventing entities from acting unconstitutionally” ).
192. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1860.
193. Id. at 1860–61.
194. Lanuza v. Love, 899 F.3d 1019,1027–29 ( 9th Cir. 2018 ); see also Jacobs v. Alam, 915
F.3d 1028, 1038 (6th Cir. 2019 ) ( distinguishing between an “overarching challenge[ ] to federal policy,”
and a “claim[ ] against . . . individual officers for their alleged ‘overreach’” ( quoting Abbasi, 137
S. Ct. at 1862 ) ); Rroku v. Cole, 726 Fed. Appx. 201, 206 (5th Cir. 2018 ) ( per curiam ) ( holding
that special factors existed because changing immigration detention policy is the role of the
legislative branch ).
195. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1862.
196. See Maria S. ex rel. E.H.F. v. Garza, 912 F.3d 778, 784 ( 5th Cir. 2019 ).
197. Diaz-Bernal v. Myers, 758 F. Supp. 2d 106, 128 ( D. Conn. 2010 ) ( finding no
special factors ).
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bond determinations.198 This context therefore raises separation-of-powers
concerns related to immigration policy and enforcement similar to Abbasi and
Hernandez.199 Courts may also decide that immigration detention policies
“implicate[ ] an element of national security,” which was part of the Court’s
reasoning in Hernandez.200 However, the court in Hernandez connected national
security concerns to “the conduct of agents positioned at the border,” not
individuals detained within the United States.201
A final consideration in the Bivens analysis is whether any alternative remedy
is available. In Rroku, an unpublished case that was brought pro se, the Fifth Circuit
refused to extend a Bivens cause of action to a detained noncitizen who sued the
ICE Field Office Director and the warden of the LaSalle Detention Facility in
Louisiana where he had been detained for 513 days under harsh and dangerous
conditions.202 There, the court found that the petitioner could seek an alternative
remedy through a state tort law claim.203 In Maria S., where a grandmother sued a
CBP agent for coercing her granddaughter into signing a voluntary removal form,
which resulted in her death in Mexico, the Fifth Circuit concluded that alternative
remedies are available under the Immigration and Nationality Act, since noncitizens
can apply for asylum, challenge the constitutionality of their removal proceedings,
or seek a stay of removal.204
Overall, the two-part Bivens framework presents enormous obstacles for a
claim involving constitutional violations related to immigration detention
conditions and policies during the pandemic. And even if a case were to survive this
two-step inquiry, the doctrine of qualified immunity would likely foreclose relief.

198. Cf. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84–85 (1987 ) ( describing “[ r ]unning a prison” as “an
inordinately difficult undertaking that requires expertise, planning, and the commitment
of resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province of the legislative and executive
branches of government” ).
199. See Maria S., 912 F.3d at 784; Tun-Cos v. Perrotte, 922 F.3d 514, 526 (4th Cir. 2019 );
Medina v. Danaher, 445 F. Supp. 3d 1367, 1367–70 ( D. Colo. 2020 ). But see Lanuza v. Love, 899
F.3d 1019, 1030–31 ( 9th Cir. 2018 ) ( holding that the mere fact that the INA lacks an internal damages
remedy does not counsel hesitation when finding an implied Bivens remedy against an ICE employee );
Prado v. Perez, 451 F. Supp. 3d 306, 316 ( S.D.N.Y. 2020 ) ( “There are no material differences between
the work of immigration enforcement and the work of criminal law enforcement that would counsel
against the implication of a Bivens remedy here.” ).
200. Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 746 (2020 ).
201. Id. ( “[ T ]he conduct of agents positioned at the border has a clear and strong connection
to national security, as the Fifth Circuit understood.” ).
202. Rroku v. Cole, 726 F. App’x 201, 202 ( 5th Cir. 2018 ) (per curiam ).
203. Id. at 206.
204. Maria S., 912 F.3d at 784.
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3. Immunity

The main defense that federal officials raise to Bivens claims is qualified
immunity.205 As noted above, qualified immunity requires the plaintiff to show that
the constitutional right in question is “clearly established” for the federal official to
be liable for damages.206 The “dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is
clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his
conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.”207 In Hernandez, the Court
stressed that this analysis is “limited to ‘the facts that were knowable to the
defendant officers’ at time they engaged in the conduct in question,” so “[f]acts an
officer learns after the incident ends—whether those facts would support granting
immunity or denying it—are not relevant.”208 Given the dynamic nature of the
pandemic and evolving guidance from CDC and ICE, courts may well find that
how federal officers responded did not violate a clearly established constitutional
right, especially towards the beginning of the pandemic when their knowledge of
COVID-19 was more limited.
Qualified immunity is not only a substantive issue to overcome, but it also
creates an “immense procedural hurdle” because the Supreme Court has allowed
interlocutory appeals of the immunity determination.209 During the interlocutory
appeal, federal defendants can also raise the additional issue of whether a Bivens
action exists for the alleged conduct.210 Lower courts have also expanded
interlocutory appeals to include other issues.211 Appealing these complex questions
can “grind district court proceedings to a halt.”212 This type of dragged out litigation
with lengthy interlocutory appeals makes a Bivens action particularly inappropriate
for a life-threatening situation such as a pandemic that requires prompt relief for
medically vulnerable individuals in detention.
Exacerbating the challenges of the qualified immunity doctrine, there is an
additional barrier created by Section 233(a) of the Public Health Services Act.213
Section 223(a) gives extraordinary, absolute immunity to employees of the Public
Health Service (PHS), including those who administer health care in immigration
205. Some courts have applied the immunity doctrine to Bivens claims requesting injunctive
relief as well as damages. See Patel v. Santana, 348 F. App’x 974, 976 ( 5th Cir. 2009 ) (“[ I ]njunctive
relief against the BOP [ is ] a form of relief that would not be proper under Bivens.” ).
206. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200–02 ( 2001 ).
207. Id. at 202.
208. Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2007 ( 2017 ) ( per curiam ) (vacating the Fifth
Circuit’s qualified immunity finding but declining to decide whether the CBP officer was entitled to
qualified immunity ).
209. Bryan Lammon, Making Wilkie Worse: Qualified-Immunity Appeals and the Bivens Question
After Ziglar and Hernandez, U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE, July 24, 2020, at 1.
210. See generally Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537 (2007 ) ( extending Hartman v. Moore, 547
U.S. 250 ( 2006 ) ).
211. Lammon, supra note 209, at 7.
212. Id. at 1.
213. Public Health Services Act, 42 U.S.C. § 233(a ).
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detention centers through the ICE Health Corps.214 In Hui v. Castaneda, the
Supreme Court considered a Bivens action brought by the family members of an
individual who died from advanced penile cancer after atrocious medical neglect in
immigration detention by employees of the PHS.215 Despite the horrific facts of
that case, the Court held 9-0 that the PHS defendants had absolute immunity under
Section 233(a) and that the only remedy was through the FTCA.216
In short, the substantive and procedural hurdles of qualified immunity
doctrine, combined with the absolute immunity for employees of the ICE Health
Corps, make Bivens a highly impractical and ineffective way for detained noncitizens
to request relief during a pandemic.
4. Private Operators of Detention Centers
For noncitizens detained in privately-operated detention centers, two other
Supreme Court cases compound the obstacles to Bivens actions posed by Abbasi
and Hernandez.217 First, in Malesko, the Court considered a Bivens action brought by
a federal prisoner in the custody of the BOP who was serving the remainder of a
criminal sentence in a halfway house operated by the private company Correctional
Services Corporation (CSC) pursuant to a contract with the BOP.218 Malesko alleged
that he had fallen and injured himself as a result of CSC’s failure to prescribe him
necessary medications. In holding that Bivens should not be extended to allow
recovery against CSC, the Court reasoned that the purpose of Bivens is to deter the
officer who violates the constitutional right, not the company that employed the
officer.219 Malesko therefore left open the possibility that a Bivens claim could be
brought against the individual employees of a private correctional company.220
Additionally, the Court reasoned that Malesko had adequate alternative remedies
available to him, such as a state tort negligence action, a federal lawsuit for injunctive
relief, and the BOP’s grievance program.221
Subsequently, in Minneci, the Court considered whether to extend Bivens to an
Eighth Amendment damages action against the employees of a privately operated
214. See generally Hui v. Castaneda, 559 U.S. 799 ( 2010 ).
215. Id. at 805–12.
216. Id. at 812–13. See generally Adele Kimmel, Arthur Bryant & Amy Radon, Hui
v. Castaneda: Beyond Cruel and Unusual, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 297 ( 2010 ); Matthew Allen Woodward,
Note, License to Violate the Constitution: How the Supreme Court’s Decision in Hui v. Castaneda Exposes the
Dangers of Constitutional Immunity and Revives the Debate over Widespread Constitutional Abuses in Our Immigration
Detention Facilities, 32 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 499, 452–53 ( 2011 ); Kate Bowles, Note, Is the Doctor
in? The Contemptible Conditions of Immigrant Detainee Healthcare in the U.S. and the Need for a Constitutional
Remedy, 31 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 169 ( 2011 ).
217. See Danielle C. Jefferis, Constitutionally Unaccountable: Privatized Immigration Detention, 95
IND. L.J. 145 ( 2020 ).
218. Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 70–74 (2001 ).
219. Id. at 69 ( citing Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 484–86 ( 1994 ) ).
220. Id. at 65 ( noting that the question of whether a Bivens action might lie against private
individuals was not presented ).
221. Id. at 72–74.
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federal prison.222 Once again, the Court relied on the existence of an alternative
state tort remedy in declining to extend Bivens, recognizing differences in the remedy
but concluding that state tort law would provide “roughly similar compensation.”223
While the Court acknowledged that there may be Eighth Amendment
violations not covered by state tort law, it left that issue for another day.224 The
Court did not explicitly bar all Bivens claims against the employees of private
prisons.225 Nevertheless, several courts have interpreted Minneci expansively as
barring all such claims.226 As Danielle Jefferis has argued, Malesko and Minneci
together “carved out a class of prisoners for whom there is no constitutional tort
remedy,” not only for federal prisoners but also for immigration detainees in
privately-operated facilities.227
III. TORT-BASED ACTIONS AS POTENTIAL ALTERNATIVES
While courts and scholars have extensively discussed whether a tort-based
action provides an adequate alternative remedy to a Bivens action for damages, there
has been hardly any discussion of whether a tort-based action can provide an
alternative remedy to a habeas petition. In Carlson, the Supreme Court found that
the FTCA is not an equivalent remedy to Bivens, since Congress “made it crystal
clear that it views FTCA and Bivens as parallel, complementary causes of action.”228
Carlson explained that the FTCA protects different rights than Bivens. While an
FTCA cause of action is based on state tort law, a Bivens action is based on violation
of a constitutional right.229 Nevertheless, some courts have questioned whether
Carlson’s FTCA analysis should be reexamined post-Abbasi.230 Similarly, some
district courts have found no subject matter jurisdiction over habeas petitions by
detained immigrants reasoning that an alternative remedy in tort is available under
the FTCA or state tort law.231 This Section explains why neither an FTCA claim nor
a state tort law claim may be a viable option.

222. Minneci v. Pollard, 565 U.S. 118, 120 ( 2012 ).
223. Id. at 130.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 131 ( concluding that “where, as here, a federal prisoner seeks damages from privately
employed personnel working at a privately operated federal prison, where the conduct allegedly
amounts to a violation of the Eighth Amendment, and where that conduct is of a kind that typically
falls within the scope of traditional state tort law ( such as the conduct involving improper medical care
at issue here ), the prisoner must seek a remedy under state tort law” ).
226. Jefferis, supra note 217, at 173.
227. Id.
228. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 20 (1980 ).
229. Id. at 23.
230. See Ojo v. United States, 364 F. Supp. 3d 163, 174–75 ( E.D.N.Y. 2019 ) ( citing
other sources ).
231. Umarbaev v. Moore, No. 3:20-CV-1279, 2020 WL 3051448, at *2, *6 ( N.D. Tex. June 6, 2020 ).
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A. Federal Tort Claims Act
The FTCA was enacted in 1946 and is not a civil rights statute, but it provides
a cause of action against the United States for monetary compensation for harm
“caused by the negligent act or omission” of federal employees.232 The FTCA
creates liability for the United States when federal employees, acting within the
scope of their employment, commit acts that would be actionable under state tort
law if committed by a private party.233 Consequently, courts must consult state law
to determine whether the United States is liable for the torts of its employees under
the FTCA.234 In order to bring a claim under the FTCA, the plaintiff must first
present the administrative claim to the appropriate federal agency within two years
of when the cause of action occurred and must then file the claim in federal court
within six months of the agency’s action.235
Courts have held that the FTCA does not waive sovereign immunity in
circumstances governed exclusively by federal law where there is no private
analogue for the government’s action.236 For example, in Caban, where the plaintiff
alleged false imprisonment by immigration officers, the Second Circuit found no
FTCA liability, reasoning that the immigration officers had materially different
duties than private citizens and acted in accordance with federal law, even if
a private person could be liable under state law for wrongfully detaining the
plaintiff.237 Similarly, in Watson, the Second Circuit found no private analogue for
an FTCA claim against immigration officers who failed to comply with ICE’s own
regulations for investigating an assertion of citizenship, resulting in three-and-a-half
years of detention.238 The Eleventh Circuit also found no comparable private
liability under state law to support an FTCA claim against immigration agents in a
case involving the use of pepper spray to disperse a crowd.239
Additionally, the waiver of sovereign immunity provided by the FTCA is
limited by numerous exceptions.240 The exceptions commonly invoked by the
government in cases involving immigration detention pertain to independent

232. 28 U.S.C. § 2672 ( 2006 ).
233. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346( b )( 1 ), 2674; Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471,
477 (1994 ).
234. Meyer, 510 U.S. at 478.
235. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2675( a ), 2401( b ). The six-month time limit is subject to equitable tolling.
United States v. Wong, 575 U.S. 402, 412 ( 2015 ).
236. Paul David Stern, Tort Justice Reform, 52 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 649, 683–84 ( 2019 ); 28
U.S.C. § 1346( b ).
237. Caban v. United States, 728 F.2d 68, 74 ( 2d Cir. 1984 ); see also Woodbridge Plaza v. Bank
of Irvine, 815 F.2d 538, 543 (9th Cir. 1987 ) ( reasoning that FDIC’s liability is unlike that of a
private individual under California law and therefore finding no private analogue ). But see Liranzo
v. United States, 690 F.3d 78, 86 (2d Cir. 2012 ) ( finding a private analogue for federal action through
false imprisonment ).
238. Watson v. United States, 865 F.3d 123, 126–27 ( 2d Cir. 2017 ).
239. Dalrymple v. United States, 460 F.3d 1318, 1327–28 (11th Cir. 2006 ).
240. 28 U.S.C. § 2680( a ).
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contractors, discretionary functions, and due care.241 These exceptions are all
construed strictly in favor of the government.242 There is also an exception for
intentional torts, including assault and battery, false imprisonment, false arrest,
abusive of process, and malicious prosecution.243 But an exception to that exception
exists for law enforcement officials, which can include immigration officials, so the
intentional torts exception is not usually an obstacle.244
First, the independent-contractor exception can preclude claims against a
private correctional company that contracts with ICE. 245 For example, in one
case, the Third Circuit found that the detention facility was an independent
contractor to which the government had delegated its duty of safekeeping.246
Therefore, the independent contractor exception to the FTCA applied and
sovereign immunity barred the court from exercising jurisdiction.247 However, in
cases where courts found that ICE had delegated some but not all of its
responsibilities to an independent contractor, the courts refused to apply the
independent-contractor exception.248
Even if the independent-contractor exception does not apply, the
discretionary exception can block claims related to immigration detention
conditions or policies.249 The discretionary exception applies if the challenged act
involves an “element of judgment” and the judgment is ”“of the kind the
discretionary function exception was designed to shield.”250 The Ninth Circuit has
found that the type of detention falls within the discretionary-function exception to
waiver of sovereign immunity.251 The Ninth Circuit has also held that the discretion
inherent in the formulation of federal immigration policy is not actionable under
the FTCA.252
Assuming a claimant overcomes the independent-contractor exception and
discretionary exception, there is still the “due care” exception, which “prevents the
United States from being held liable for actions of its officers undertaken while

241. Id.
242. McMahon v. United States, 342 U.S. 25, 27 ( 1951 ).
243. 28 U.S.C. § 2680( h ).
244. See generally Medina v. United States, 92 F. Supp. 2d 545 ( E.D. Va. 2000 ); Ramirez v. United
States, 998 F. Supp. 425 ( D.N.J. 1998 ); Caban v. United States, 671 F.2d 1230 ( 2d Cir. 1982 ).
245. See Note, Improving the Carceral Conditions of Federal Immigration Detainees, 125
HARV. L. REV. 1476, 1491 ( 2012 ); Maunica Sthanki, Deconstructing Detention: Structural Impunity and the
Need for an Intervention, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 447, 473 (2013 ).
246. E.D. v. United States, 764 F. App’x 169, 172–73 ( 3d Cir. 2019 ).
247. Id.
248. Edison v. United States, 822 F.3d 510, 518 ( 9th Cir. 2016 ); Haskin v. United States, 569
F. App’x 12, 15 ( 2d Cir. 2014 ).
249. See United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322–23 ( 1991 ).
250. Id.
251. Mirmehdi v. United States, 689 F.3d 975, 984 ( 9th Cir. 2012 ).
252. Maffei v. Nieves-Reta, 412 F. Supp. 43, 44 ( S.D. Cal. 1976 ), aff’d, 549 F.2d 807 ( 9th
Cir. 1977 ) ( mem. ).
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reasonably executing the mandates of a statute.”253 Where the statute requires a
mandatory course of action, sovereign immunity has not been waived if “the officer
exercised due care in following the dictates of that statute or regulation.”254 Courts
have found that the “due care” exception applies to immigrants challenging their
mandatory detention under the INA.255
The independent contractor, discretionary functions, and due-care exceptions
to the waiver of sovereign immunity for FTCA claims, combined with the general
absence of a private action analogue for exclusively federal actions, create a series
of challenges that would be extremely difficult to overcome in a case related to
immigration detention policies and practices.
B. State Tort Claims
In the COVID-19-related habeas litigation brought by detained noncitizens,
some district courts found that state tort law provides an alternative remedy to
habeas relief and denied jurisdiction on that basis.256 However, pursuing a state tort
claim separate from the FTCA would not be feasible for a detained noncitizen
whose claim is against the federal government. The FTCA requires tort actions
against the federal government to be litigated in federal court.257 Furthermore, if the
United States, a federal agency, or a federal officer were sued in state court,
they would undoubtedly use their independent authority to remove the action to
federal court.258
Additionally, the main claim in the COVID-19-related habeas litigation is that
the detention is punitive in violation of the Fifth Amendment Due Process
Clause.259 This is not an area generally covered by state law and there is no obvious
state tort that would apply in these cases. While someone who is injured or dies in
detention due to medical malpractice may be able to bring a state tort claim, punitive
detention conditions more generally are not actionable in tort.260
As Maunica Sthanki has noted, an action “based on the claim that detention
conditions rise to the level of punishment impermissible by the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment is not one that is generally covered by state law.”261 John
Preis has likewise argued that prison conditions may violate the Constitution
without being a tort.262 With respect to constitutional claims in general, Preis
253. Welch v. United States, 409 F.3d 646, 651 ( 4th Cir. 2005 ).
254. Id. at 652.
255. See Gonzalez v. United States, No. CV-12-01912, 2013 WL 942363, at *3 ( C.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2013 ).
256. Umarbaev v. Moore, No. 3:20-CV-1279, 2020 WL 3051448, at *2, *6 (N.D. Tex. June 6, 2020 ).
257. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346( b )( 1 ) (2013 ) ( “[ T ]he district courts . . . shall have exclusive
jurisdiction of civil actions on [ tort ] claims against the United States, for money damages.” ).
258. 28 U.S.C. § 1442( a )( 1 ).
259. See supra notes 60–96.
260. See Sthanki, supra note 245, at 473 n.168.
261. Id.; see also Note, supra note 245, at 1486–89.
262. John F. Preis, Alternative State Remedies in Constitutional Torts, 40 CONN. L. REV. 723,
753–54 ( 2008 ).
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explains that it is “unlikely that tort law will contain doctrines that can adequately
capture behavior understood to be unconstitutional,” since “[t]ort law generally
addresses interactions between private individuals and constitutional law addresses
interactions between the government and private individuals.”263
Even if state tort law could theoretically provide an alternative remedy, there
are practical obstacles. In Bivens, the Supreme Court noted that state law can be
“inconsistent or even hostile” to federal constitutional law.264 Because many state
court judges are elected, not appointed, they may be more influenced by public
opinion.265 Additionally, the three states where the majority of noncitizens are
detained—Texas, Louisiana, and Arizona—have highly restrictive tort policies.266
Texas, in particular, where a quarter of the nation’s immigration detainees are
located, “is one of the states—perhaps the state—in which tort reformers have had
the most success.”267
Given the variation in state tort laws, there are also strong policy reasons
against recognizing state tort claims as alternative remedies to habeas. The variation
in state law would result in a lack of uniformity in access to habeas as a form of
relief for detained immigrants, as well as lack of uniformity in the accountability of
the government, depending on where the noncitizen happened to be detained. This
lack of uniformity would undermine basic principles of fairness.268 Such
consequences are important to consider in deciding what remedies should be
considered adequate alternatives to the Great Writ.269

263. Id. at 750; see also Sheldon Nahmod, Section 1983 Discourse: The Move from Constitution to Tort,
77 GEO. L.J. 1719, 1738–50 ( 1989 ) (addressing the deleterious “implications of tort rhetoric” ); Richard
Henry Seamon, U.S. Torture as a Tort, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 715, 758 ( 2006 ) ( “Using tort law to remedy
torture [ by the U.S. government ] is like using nuisance law to handle the generation and disposal of
hazardous wastes. In each situation, the problem is simply much bigger and badder than the problems
for which the law was designed.” ); Christina Brooks Whitman, Emphasizing the Constitutional in
Constitutional Torts, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 661, 686 ( 1997 ) (“It is dangerous to define constitutional
claims as a narrow subset of tort law because tort law has been particularly ineffective in dealing with
precisely the sorts of interests and injuries that are at the center of constitutional law.” ).
264. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
394 (1971 ).
265. Note, supra note 245, at 1490 ( citing Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105,
1127–28 (1977 ) ).
266. Sthanki, supra note 245, at 473. See generally Frank L. Maraist & Thomas C. Galligan,
Jr., Burying Caesar: Civil Justice Reform and the Changing Face of Louisiana Tort Law, 71 TUL. L. REV. 339
( 1996 ) ( describing various tort reforms passed in Louisiana ); David A. Anderson, Judicial Tort Reform in
Texas, 26 REV. LITIG. 1 ( 2007 ) ( describing tort reform in Texas ).
267. Anderson, supra note 266, at 4.
268. Cristina M. Rodríguez, Uniformity and Integrity in Immigration Law: Lessons from the Decisions of
Justice ( and Judge) Sotomayor, 123 YALE L.J.F. 499, 501 ( 2014 ) ( explaining that uniformity “facilitates
equal treatment” by treating similarly situated parties in like ways ).
269. Alex Reinert, Procedural Barriers to Civil Rights Litigation and the Illusory Promise of Equity, 78
UMKC L. REV. 931, 933 (2010 ) ( observing that “important strategic consequences flow from decisions
to seek different kinds of remedies” ).
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IV. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AS A POTENTIAL ALTERNATIVE
The tort actions discussed above would only result in damages, not release
from detention or changes in the conditions of detention. Damages are normally a
retrospective remedy for an injury that has already occurred, while injunctive relief
is designed to be a prospective remedy for ongoing or future violations.270 Damages
may also be an inferior remedy in certain situations involving the deprivation of
constitutional rights.271 Injunctive relief helps expose government misconduct, in
part because it is not barred by sovereign immunity and can provide a “fuller”
remedy than damages.272 As John Jeffries Jr. has argued, the possibility of injunctive
relief also allows courts to be more future looking and reform minded.273
The unique benefits of injunctive relief, combined with the overwhelming
hurdles presented by the causes of action for damages discussed above, should,
at a minimum, encourage courts to ensure that an avenue for injunctive relief
remains available before rejecting habeas jurisdiction.274 Courts considering
COVID-19-related habeas petitions filed by immigration detainees have discussed
at least two possible sources of injunctive relief that could result in release: (1) an
implied cause of action directly under the Fifth Amendment, which can also be
framed as a federal court’s inherent equitable authority to restrain constitutional
government conduct; and (2) a claim under the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA). These are explored below.
A. Implied Cause of Action Directly Under the Fifth Amendment
For over a century, the Supreme Court has recognized the inherent authority
of federal courts to grant equitable relief for constitutional violations, including
injunctive relief.275 In Bivens, Justice Harlan’s concurrence confirmed the
270. 1A C.J.S. Actions § 28 ( “There are two types of relief that can be sought in a civil
action: ( 1 ) retrospective relief, such as money damages, and ( 2 ) prospective relief, such as injunctive or
declaratory relief.” ).
271. Karlan, supra note 133, at 1329. See generally Jeffries, supra note 129.
272. Karlan, supra note 133; Lawrence Rosenthal, A Theory of Governmental Damages Liability: Torts,
Constitutional Torts, and Takings, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 797, 828–29 ( 2007 ); see also Schneider v. Smith,
390 U.S. 17, 21, 24 ( 1968 ) ( holding that sovereign immunity does not prevent injunctive relief ).
273. Jeffries, supra note 133, at 113.
274. Cf. Alirio R.R. v. Correia, No. 20-6217, 2020 WL 3249109, at *5, *9 (D.N.J. June 16, 2020)
( considering a COVID-19-related habeas petition and concluding that either “a Bivens claim for
injunctive relief” or habeas must be available, if not both, and that both types of actions required the
same substantive analysis: whether the petitioner is entitled to injunctive relief due to a violation of the
Fifth Amendment ).
275. Osborn v. Bank of U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheaton ) 738, 838–44 ( 1824 ); Ex Parte Young, 209
U.S. 123, 149, 155–56 (1908 ) ( holding that subject matter jurisdiction of federal courts empowers them
to enjoin potentially unconstitutional acts by state officials ); see also Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534
U.S. 61, 74 ( 2001 ); Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 491 n.2 ( 2010 );
Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946 ) ( “[ I ]t is established practice for this Court to sustain the
jurisdiction of federal courts to issue injunctions to protect rights safeguarded by the Constitution.” );
Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Com. Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 689–90 ( 1949 ) ( noting that federal officials
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“presumed availability of federal equitable relief against threatened invasions of
constitutional interests.”276 In Malesko, the Supreme Court contrasted “the Bivens
remedy [i.e. damages], which we have never considered a proper vehicle for altering
an entity’s policy,” with injunctive relief, which “has long been recognized as the
proper means for preventing entities from acting unconstitutionally.”277
Further, in Abbasi, the Court noted the possibility of injunctive relief, distinct
from Bivens or habeas relief, stating that plaintiffs’ challenge to policy decisions
concerning the conditions of confinement could be addressed through a motion
for an injunction.278 As Seth Davis has observed, “federal courts permit private
parties to sue directly under the Constitution for injunctive relief as a matter
of course, but are much more wary of implied damages remedies under the
Bivens doctrine.”279 Generally, courts will only reject an implied cause of action for
injunctive relief if Congress has specifically prohibited it.280
Accordingly, a few district courts have concluded that noncitizens challenging
their detention during the COVID-19 pandemic have an implied cause of action
directly under the Fifth Amendment even if habeas fails on jurisdictional grounds.281
In Malam, for example, a district court in the Eastern District of Michigan reasoned
that although the Bivens remedy of damages should not be extended to new contexts
if there are special factors counseling hesitation, “there is no corresponding
may be subject to “suits for specific relief” ); RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID
L. SHAPIRO, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 856 (David L. Shapiro et
al. eds., 4th ed. 1996 ) ( “[ A ]t least since Brown v. Board of Education . . . injunctive remedies for
constitutional violations have become the rule.” ).
276. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 404
( 1971 ) ( Harlan, J., concurring ).
277. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 74; see also Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 491 n.2; Bell, 327 U.S. at 684
( “[ I ]t is established practice for this Court to sustain the jurisdiction of federal courts to issue
injunctions to protect rights safeguarded by the Constitution.” ); Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 149,
155–56 ( holding that subject matter jurisdiction of federal courts empowers them to enjoin potentially
unconstitutional acts by state officials ); John F. Preis, In Defense of Implied Injunctive Relief in Constitutional
Cases, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 38–42 ( 2013 ) ( arguing that Congress and the federal courts
have viewed implied injunctive relief as permissible and appropriate since the Founding ). See
generally David Sloss, Ex Parte Young and Federal Remedies for Human Rights Treaty Violations, 75
WASH. L. REV. 1103 ( 2000 ).
278. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1862–63 ( 2017 ).
279. Seth Davis, Implied Public Rights of Action, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8 ( 2014 ); see also Jefferis,
supra note 217, at 167 ( “Federal prisoners may bring actions in federal court for equitable
relief—injunctions and declaratory judgments—directly under the Constitution, and they may seek
damages under certain ‘implied’ causes of action for constitutional torts.” ); Michael G. Collins,
“Economic Rights,” Implied Constitutional Actions, and the Scope of Section 1983, 77 GEO. L.J. 1493, 1510 ( 1989 )
( “Implied actions under the Constitution and under the federal question statute for equitable relief
against state or federal officers have never generated much controversy during this century, and the
Court frequently has acknowledged their lengthy tradition.” ).
280. Preis, supra note 262.
281. Malam v. Adducci, 452 F. Supp. 3d 643, 651–52 ( E.D. Mich. 2020 ); Mohammed
S. v. Tritten, No. 20-CV-783, 2020 WL 2750109, at *2 n.5 ( D. Minn. May 27, 2020 );
Urdaneta v. Keeton, No. CV-20-00654, 2020 WL 2319980, at *7 ( D. Ariz. May 11, 2020 ); Angelica
C. v. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, No. 20-cv-913, 2020 WL 3441461, at *11 ( D. Minn. June 5, 2020 ).
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limitation on the Constitution as a cause of action to seek injunctive or equitable
relief.”282 The court relied on the power of federal courts to grant equitable relief
for constitutional violations, finding no sovereign immunity in this situation.283
Similarly, in Zepeda Rivas, a district court in the Northern District of California
concluded that, “[i]f ICE were correct that habeas relief is not available here, then
the plaintiffs would be entitled to relief under the equitable power of federal courts
to restrain unlawful executive action.”284
However, other courts have refused to find an implied cause of action directly
under the Fifth Amendment.285 Within the Fifth Circuit, district courts have relied
on Hearth, which observes that “the federal courts, and this Circuit in particular,
have been hesitant to find causes of action arising directly from the
Constitution.”286 There, the court framed the issue as pertaining to separation of
powers, noting that “the framers of the Constitution saw fit to entrust the job of
legislating to the Congress.”287 The court explained the Bivens remedy as
“necessitated primarily by the absence of alternative remedies.”288 Consequently,
district courts have reasoned that noncitizens seeking release due to COVID-19
have failed to show an absence of other remedies (e.g. the civil rights remedies
discussed above) and therefore cannot claim a cause of action for injunctive relief
directly under the Fifth Amendment.289 However, if, as argued above, the civil rights
remedies are often illusory, then considering a direct cause of action under the Fifth
Amendment would be consistent with Hearth.
Within the Eleventh Circuit, district courts have applied an Eleventh Circuit
precedent called Gomez in holding that release is not a possible form of injunctive
relief based on either a cause of action directly under the Fifth Amendment or under
the APA.290 Gomez found that even if the prisoner prevailed in his habeas petition,
which was based on inadequate medical treatment in violation of his Eighth

282. Malam, 452 F. Supp. 3d at 651–52 (citing Abbasi, 137 S.Ct. at 1862 ).
283. Id.
284. Zepeda Rivas v. Jennings, 465 F. Supp. 3d 1028, 1036 ( N.D. Cal. 2020 ) ( first citing
Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S. 320, 326–27 ( 2015 ) ; then citing Sierra Club
v. Trump, 929 F.3d 670, 694 (9th Cir. 2019 ); then citing Solida v. McKelvey, 820 F.3d 1090, 1096 (9th
Cir. 2016 ); and then citing Abbasi, 137 S.Ct. at 1862 ).
285. See Sacal-Micha v. Longoria, No. 1:20-CV-37, 2020 WL 1815691, at *8 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 9,
2020 ); Umarbaev v. Moore, No. 3:20-CV-1279, 2020 WL 3051448, at *5 (N.D. Tex. June 6, 2020 )
( quoting Sacal-Micha, 2020 WL 1815691, at *8 ); Shah v. Wolf, No. 3:20-CV-994, 2020 WL 4456530, at
*6 n.3 (N.D. Tex. July 13, 2020 ); see also Codner v. Choate, No. 20-cv-01050, 2020 WL 2769938, at *7
( D. Colo. May 27, 2020 ) ( rejecting the argument that the court has inherent equitable authority to
remedy unconstitutional government conduct ).
286. Hearth, Inc. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 617 F.2d 381, 382 ( 5th Cir. 1980 ) ( per curiam ).
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. See, e.g., Umarbaev, 2020 WL 3051448, at *5–6.
290. Gayle v. Meade, No. 20-21553, 2020 WL 1949737, at *24–26 ( S.D. Fla. Apr. 22, 2020 )
( citing Gomez v. United States, 899 F.2d 1124, 1125–26 ( 11th Cir. 1990 ).
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Amendment, he still would not be entitled to release.291 Instead, the relief would be
to require discontinuance of any improper practices.292 The difficulty with this
approach is that the court would have to fashion some remedy to the problem of
continued detention while the government fixes the conditions creating a
constitutional problem, assuming it is not a quick fix.293
Since over sixty percent of noncitizens are detained within the Fifth and
Eleventh Circuits, with particularly high numbers in Texas, Louisiana, and
Georgia,294 Hearth and Gomez present significant obstacles to injunctive relief.
Outside of the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, courts may be more open to granting
injunctive relief in the form of release. Yet there is often still some reluctance to
recognizing inherent authority to grant injunctive relief, which Akhil Reed Amar
attributes to “a lingering doubt about whether remedy-fashioning is a more
legislative than judicial function, and from an awareness of the special political
vulnerability of federal judges in suits involving coercive relief against agents in
coordinate branches of government.”295
B. Claims Under the Administrative Procedure Act
A claim for injunctive relief could also be brought under the Administrative
Procedure Act, which provides a cause of action for non-monetary relief to
individuals who are “suffering legal wrong because of agency action.”296 However,
the APA itself does not grant subject matter jurisdiction to federal courts.297 Thus,
if a court did not recognize habeas jurisdiction, it would need to recognize a separate
basis for jurisdiction, such as an action directly under the Fifth Amendment or a
writ for an injunction.298
There are several requirements for bringing a claim under the APA. The suit
must challenge “final agency action,“ and there must be “no other adequate remedy
in a court.”299 Assuming these two requirements are met, agency action is still
unreviewable if there is a statutory prohibition to judicial review or if the action is
291. Gomez, 899 F.2d at 1126.
292. Id.
293. Janet Cooper Alexander, Jurisdiction-Stripping in a Time of Terror, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1193,
1229 ( 2007 ) ( describing the problem of “hav[ ing ] to fashion some response to the government’s
request for continued detention while it fixed the constitutional problem” ).
294. See FREEDOM FOR IMMIGRANTS, supra note 16.
295. Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1508 (1987 ).
296. 5 U.S.C. § 702; see Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 n.4
( 1986 ) ( recognizing that the APA creates a private right of action ).
297. Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105–07 ( 1977 ) ( “[ T ]he APA nowhere contains an
explicit grant of jurisdiction to challenge agency action in the federal courts.” ); Air Courier Conf. of
Am. v. Am. Postal Workers Union, 498 U.S. 517, 523 n.3 ( 1993 ) ( stating that the judicial review
provision of the APA is not jurisdictional ).
298. 5 U.S.C. § 703 ( providing that judicial review of agency action under the APA may proceed
by “any applicable form of legal action, including actions for declaratory judgments or writs of
prohibitory or mandatory injunction or habeas corpus” ).
299. 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704.
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committed to agency discretion by law.300 Once the requirements for judicial review
are met, the court must set aside any agency action found to be “arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”301
In some cases, detained noncitizens have tried to argue that ICE’s failure to
abide by its COVID-19 Pandemic Response Requirements (PRR) is arbitrary and
capricious under the APA.302 In these cases, the noncitizens relied on the Accardi
doctrine, which stands for the “proposition that agencies may not violate their own
rules and regulations to the prejudice of others.”303 Internal agency guidance that is
intended to be binding falls within the ambit of the Accardi doctrine.304 The
government responded that the PRR do not constitute agency action, much less
“final agency action,” nor are they the type of rules encompassed by the Accardi
doctrine, which has traditionally been applied only to procedural rules.305
In a case brought by transgender immigration detainees called C.G.B., the
D.C. District Court agreed with the government that the PRR do not represent
“final agency action,” relying on precedents explaining that “[w]hile a single step or
measure is reviewable, an on-going program or policy is not, in itself, a final agency
action under the APA.”306 The court stressed that the plaintiffs had not identified
“any discrete final agency decision not to implement the PRR,” explaining that
allegations of general insufficiencies in complying with the PRR lacked the
specificity needed for agency action.307
In another case that was brought by the National Immigration Project of the
National Lawyers Guild against both the Department of Homeland Security and
the Executive Office for Immigration Review challenging policies that affected
access to counsel during the pandemic, the D.C. District Court likewise found no
“final agency action” under the APA, concluding that the government’s choices
about how best to respond to a pandemic were discretionary and therefore
unreviewable.308 There, the court noted “the rapidly changing situation related to
the COVID-19 pandemic.”309 The court also stressed that ICE’s policies are
implemented “based on the particularized circumstances present at detention
centers.”310

300. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701( a )( 1 )–( 2 ).
301. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2 )( A ).
302. See, e.g., C.G.B. v. Wolf, 464 F. Supp. 3d 174, 224–27 (D.D.C. 2020 ).
303. Battle v. F.A.A., 393 F.3d 1330, 1336. (D.C. Cir. 2005 ). See generally United States ex
rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 ( 1954 ).
304. Damus v. Nielsen, 313 F. Supp. 3d 317, 337–38 (D.D.C. 2017 ).
305. C.G.B., 464 F. Supp. 3d at 225.
306. Id. (quoting Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081, 1095 ( D.C. Cir. 2001 ) ).
307. Id.
308. Nat’l Immigr. Project of Nat’l Laws. Guild v. Exec. Off. Immigr. Rev., 456 F. Supp. 3d 16,
30–32 (D.D.C. 2020 ).
309. Id. at 25.
310. Id. at 31.
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A third case brought in D.C. also reached the same conclusion. In D.A.M.,
the district court found that petitioners were unlikely to succeed with the argument
that ICE’s failure to follow its own policies as well as CDC guidance in responding
to the COVID-19 pandemic is arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA.311
Because these guidelines set out substantive standards for how to handle the
pandemic, rather than procedural requirements, the court reasoned that they do not
fall within the ambit of the Accardi doctrine.
Some courts have found that the arguments based on the Accardi doctrine
are unlikely to succeed due to the flexible language in ICE’s and CDC’s
COVID-19-related guidance.312 Others have found that the government’s decisions
about what measures to take to mitigate the risk of COVID-19 are unreviewable
because they are discretionary.313 For example, a court in the Southern District of
Texas applied the exception to judicial review for discretionary decisions.314
Jurisdictional issues may also arise under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), which prohibits courts
from hearing “any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the
decision or action by the Attorney General to commence [removal] proceedings,
adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien.”315 Although
challenges to detention conditions do not “arise from” any of these three discrete
categories,316 the government frequently invokes § 1252(g) as a jurisdictional bar in
conditions cases.317
Insofar as judicial review under the APA requires that there be “no other
adequate remedy in a court,” the Supreme Court has cautioned that this language
should be read narrowly, so as not “to defeat the central purpose of providing a

311. D.A.M. v. Barr, 474 F. Supp. 3d 45, 66 (D.D.C. 2020 ).
312. See, e.g., Gayle v. Meade, No. 20-21553, 2020 WL 1949737, at *28 ( S.D. Fla. Apr. 22, 2020)
( “CDC Guidelines contain a substantial amount of flexibility and courts . . . have relied on this
adaptability when denying applications for release of inmates or detainees.” ); Benavides v. Gartland,
No. 5:20-cv-46, 2020 WL 3839938, at *11 ( S.D. Ga. July 8, 2020 ) ( finding that CDC guidance “was
not intended to be followed with rigid precision” ).
313. Sacal-Micha v. Longoria, No. 1:20-CV-37, 2020 WL 1518861, at *7 ( S.D. Tex. Mar. 27, 2020 ).
314. Id.
315. 8 U.S.C. § 1252( g ) ( 2005 ).
316. Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 ( 1999 ) ( concluding
that § 1252( g ) “applies only to three discrete actions that the Attorney General may take” and finding
it “implausible” that the language of § 1252( g ) “was a shorthand way of referring to all claims arising
from deportation proceedings” ).
317. See, e.g., D.A.M. v. Barr, 474 F. Supp. 3d 45, 60 ( D.D.C. 2020 ) ( rejecting the government’s
argument that § 1252( g ) bars review of challenges related to the conditions of deportation, specifically
the transportation of detained immigrants during the COVID-19 pandemic ); Innovation L. Lab
v. Nielsen, 342 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1076–77 (D. Or. 2018 ) ( rejecting the government’s argument that
jurisdiction was barred under § 1252( g ) where Plaintiffs raised constitutional claims about detention
conditions before removal proceedings commenced ). But see Thakker v. Doll, No. 1:20-CV-480, 2020
WL 9349674, at *8 ( M.D. Pa. Aug. 24, 2020 ) ( finding that § 1252(g ) posed a jurisdictional issue and
denying a motion for a preliminary injunction where the plaintiffs challenged conditions related to
transport during the COVID-19 pandemic for purposes of deportation ), report and recommendation adopted
in part, rejected in part, No. 1:20-CV-480, 2021 WL 780301 ( M.D. Pa. Mar. 1, 2021 ).
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broad spectrum of judicial review of agency action.”318 The D.C. Circuit has
described the adequate-remedy question in the APA context as a practical one that
requires asking whether the alternative remedy would afford the same relief to
plaintiffs as suit under the APA.319 Nevertheless, a court that concludes that a
remedy under Section 1983, Bivens, a state tort claim, or a claim directly under the
Fifth Amendment is available may decide that there is no judicial review under the
APA. In habeas litigation related to the COVID-19 pandemic, district courts
generally have not found a likelihood of success on an APA claim.320
CONCLUSION
If courts refuse to recognize jurisdiction over habeas petitions brought by
detained noncitizens seeking release due to life-threatening conditions, this
vulnerable population may be left with no remedy at all. In the Bivens context, courts
and scholars have contemplated the difference between practical, meaningful
remedies and merely theoretical ones. As this Article has shown, the same issue is
arising in the habeas context with respect to petitions brought by detained
noncitizens and requires more than a cursory evaluation.
The best way for courts to protect detained individuals is to exercise
jurisdiction over conditions-based and fact-based habeas petitions alike, as four
circuits have already done. For courts that are unwilling to embrace that approach,
however, it is critical to at least consider whether meaningful alternative remedies
are available before rejecting habeas jurisdiction. This Article cautions against
relying on a vague, generalized notion that challenges to the conditions of detention
should be made through civil rights claims, much less tort claims.
Simply recognizing habeas jurisdiction in petitions brought by detained
noncitizens would not automatically mean that the petitioner should be released.
The petitioner would still have to satisfy the rigorous requirements of showing
deliberate indifference in order to establish a due process violation. That analysis is
the same, whether the vehicle is a habeas petition, Section 1983 claim, Bivens claim,
or a direct action under the Constitution.
Additionally, after exercising jurisdiction, courts have considered numerous
factors in determining whether a petitioner should be released, such as whether the
petitioner is at higher risk of contracting or becoming severely ill with disease,
whether social distancing is possible, and the steps taken by ICE to mitigate the
harm.321 Ultimately, whether release is an appropriate remedy depends on an

318. Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 903–04 ( 1988 ).
319. See, e.g., Women’s Equity Action League v. Cavazos, 906 F.2d 742, 751 ( D.C. Cir. 1990 );
Council of and for the Blind v. Regan, 709 F.2d 1521, 1532 ( D.C. Cir. 1983 ).
320. At best, some courts have declined to reach the APA claim. See, e.g., Guerrero v. Decker,
No. 19 Civ. 11644, 2020 WL 1244124, at *5 n.3 ( S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2020 ).
321. Singh v. Hoover, No. 1:20-CV-00627, 2020 WL 1904470, at *3 ( M.D. Pa. Apr. 17, 2020 ).
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individualized assessment of the facts of a case. Finding subject matter jurisdiction
is just the first step that would allow a court to consider these issues.
Given the prominent, unparalleled role of habeas corpus in U.S history and
the Constitution, access to the Great Writ should not be cut off simply because
another alternative exists, especially if the alternative is not meaningful. Courts have
recognized that it would be unconstitutional for Congress to completely preclude
judicial review of a constitutional challenge to conditions of confinement. Yet
rejecting habeas jurisdiction may have the exact same effect, leaving detained
noncitizens no practical path to challenge their conditions of confinement, even
during a life-threatening pandemic.
Requiring detained noncitizens to rely on alternative remedies would
also create disparities based merely on where a noncitizen happens to be
detained—whether in a state or locally operated jail, a privately operated detention
center, or in a federally operated facility, for purposes of a civil rights action, and
which state for purposes of a tort action. These differences also allow ICE to
manipulate access to civil rights and tort remedies through discretionary transfers
between detention facilities. Habeas, on the other hand, is a vehicle that does not
depend on the type of detention center and does not vary like state tort laws. By
exercising habeas jurisdiction over conditions claims, courts would ensure access to
a life-saving remedy for all detained immigrants nationwide.

